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involving federal questions.1 Under the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine (the “State Grounds Doctrine”),2 however,
the Supreme Court will not review a final decision of a state court,
notwithstanding the presence of federal questions, when the state
court based its opinion on state law that is independent of the federal
issues and adequate to support the judgment.3 In other words, if the
Supreme Court’s opinion on the federal issues would not change the
outcome of the case because the judgment rests on unreviewable
state law, the Supreme Court will not review the federal issues in the
case.4
Although the Court has referred to the constitutional ban on
advisory opinions in explaining the basis of the State Grounds
Doctrine,5 the Court has never explained adequately why the State
Grounds Doctrine is mandated by Article III.6 Commentators have
disagreed about the constitutional status of the State Grounds
Doctrine.7 Whether Article III requires the State Grounds Doctrine is
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court and in
inferior courts established by Congress and extending the judicial power to cases arising under
the Constitution and laws of the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (providing for
Supreme Court review of “final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which review of a decision could be had”); see also Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 906 (1824) (establishing that the constitutional jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court extends to all cases in which a federal question forms “an ingredient of the
original cause”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816) (recognizing
the power of the Supreme Court to review state court rulings); David A. Schlueter, Judicial
Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1079, 1080-83 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state court
judgments). All Supreme Court review of state court decisions is by discretionary writ of
certiorari. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 1257, 102 Stat. 662, 662 (1988).
2. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (stating that since the time of its
foundation the Supreme Court has refused to review judgments of state courts that are based
on “adequate and independent state grounds”).
3. See id. (describing the State Grounds Doctrine, which bans federal review of state law
decisions that rest on adequate and independent state grounds).
4. See id. at 126 (stating that the Supreme Court is not permitted to correct a state court’s
interpretation of federal law if that correction would not mandate a different judgment in the
case).
5. See id. (referring to the ban on advisory opinions as a rationale for the State Grounds
Doctrine).
6. See 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4021, at
293 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999) (noting that the Supreme Court has never fully explained the
constitutional basis for the State Grounds Doctrine).
7. Compare Richard W. Westling, Comment, Advisory Opinions and the “Constitutionally
Required” Adequate Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TUL. L. REV. 379, 390-403 (1988)
(arguing that the State Grounds Doctrine is an application of the advisory opinion ban and is
therefore grounded in Article III), with Thomas E. Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and
Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Möbius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799, 806
(1985) (arguing that the State Grounds Doctrine is a prudential, rather than constitutional,
doctrine), and Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1322-23 (1986) (arguing that the State Grounds Doctrine is not required
by the Constitution, but rather is federal common law). See also 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
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a significant question because if the State Grounds Doctrine is merely
federal common law,8 then it can be changed or eliminated by the
Supreme Court or Congress.9 If, however, Article III mandates the
State Grounds Doctrine, then it must be understood in that context.10
Congress is not free to statutorily alter or eliminate the doctrine in an
unconstitutional manner, and the Supreme Court must interpret and
apply the doctrine consistently within the limitations that Article III
places on the Court’s jurisdiction.11
The lack of a clear understanding of the constitutional limits on
Supreme Court review of state court judgments has blurred the
parameters of the State Grounds Doctrine.12 Despite the Court’s
attempts to articulate specific rules for the application of the State
Grounds Doctrine to enable state court judges to fashion opinions
protecting their lawmaking autonomy, the application of the doctrine
has been inconsistent and unpredictable. 13
This Article argues that the Constitution dictates the boundaries of
the State Grounds Doctrine. Without an understanding and explicit
recognition of the constitutional limitations imposed on the Court's
jurisdiction, the Court is prone to select erroneously cases over which
it has no jurisdiction, and erroneously decline to hear cases that it has
an obligation to decide. In particular, this Article explores the
relationship between the State Grounds Doctrine and the Article III
justiciability doctrines,14 and concludes that the constitutional
standing requirement15 and the mootness doctrine16 render state
6, § 4021, at 293 (“[T]he commonly offered advisory opinion rationale is both circular and
misdescriptive.”).
8. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1323 (arguing that the State Grounds Doctrine is
federal common law).
9. See id. at 1295 (stating that if the doctrine is governed by common law, it could be
developed and adapted to fit the legal and cultural climate).
10. See Westling, supra note 7, at 392 (advocating the position that the State Grounds
Doctrine is founded upon Article III’s proscription of advisory opinions).
11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177-78 (1803) (pronouncing the
fundamental principle that the Constitution is the supreme law of the United States and that
the Congress and the Supreme Court are bound to make and interpret the law in a manner
consistent with the Constitution).
12. See 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4021, at 293 (taking note of the tangled
theoretical arguments underlying the State Grounds Doctrine and stating that the boundaries
for Supreme Court review of state court judgments are difficult to identify).
13. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (adopting a “clear statement
rule” under which state court opinions would be immune from Supreme Court review if the
state court clearly stated that its judgment was based on state grounds).
14. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting that justiciability theories prevent
the Supreme Court from reviewing issues that are outside the purview of judicial review).
15. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that the standing requirement
derives from Article III of the Constitution).
16. See Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900) (pronouncing the rule that “[f]ederal courts
lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to
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court opinions based on independent and adequate state grounds
nonjusticiable in the Supreme Court. Additionally, this Article
argues that once the constitutional parameters of the State Grounds
Doctrine are identified, an analytical model can be fashioned that will
provide for application of this doctrine consistently with the
constitutional limitations on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
I.

THE STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE

As a threshold matter, when a litigant seeks review of a state court
opinion in a case involving both federal and state issues, the Supreme
Court must determine whether the state court’s conclusions on the
state law issues are reviewable.17 If not, any determination under the
State Grounds Doctrine as to whether the Supreme Court may review
federal issues rests upon two related, but distinct, inquiries: (1) was
the state ground of decision adequate to support the state court’s
judgment; and (2) was the decision of the state court grounded on
state law that was independent of federal law.18 Both inquiries focus
primarily on whether the Supreme Court’s determination of the
federal issues would impact the state court’s judgment.19 Both
adequacy and independence must be present before the Supreme
Court is obligated to decline review.20 If the Court concludes that the
state ground was adequate to support the judgment and independent
of federal law, further review of the federal issues in the case is
precluded.21

actual cases or controversies”).
17. The Supreme Court will not review a state court judgment, despite the involvement of
federal questions in the case, if the outcome can be sustained on unreviewable state law alone.
See Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893) (explaining the “settled law” with which the
Supreme Court must abide when deciding if review of a state court judgment is necessary or
appropriate).
18. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (stating that the Court must adhere
scrupulously to the rule that it must not “review a judgment of a state court that rests on
adequate and independent grounds in state law”) (emphasis added); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.5, at 616 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that the basic rule of the State
Grounds Doctrine is that the Supreme Court will not review a case if the state law ground is
both independent of the federal ground and sufficient alone to support the judgment).
19. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5, at 614 (stating that the Supreme Court must
decline to hear a case when the reversal of a state court’s federal law ruling would not change
the outcome).
20. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (emphasizing the principle that
the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review a state court case if the non-federal
ground for decision is both independent of the federal ground and also adequate to support
the judgment).
21. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review cases in which the
non-federal ground for decision is independent and adequate to support the state court
judgment).
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A. Supreme Court Review of State Court Determinations of State Law
The State Grounds Doctrine is the product of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Murdock v. City of Memphis,22 which held that the Supreme
Court may not review state court decisions on issues of state law.23
Murdock sued the City of Memphis in Tennessee state court, seeking
to have a trust imposed on property that Murdock’s ancestors had
conveyed to Memphis to establish a naval depot.24 According to
Murdock, the original conveyance to the City of Memphis stipulated
that if the City failed to use the land for a naval depot, the land
should be held in trust for the grantors and their heirs.25 Ten years
after the conveyance, the City of Memphis abandoned all plans to
construct a naval depot.26 Consequently, Murdock sued to have the
trust imposed as set out in the original conveyance.27 The Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that the City of
Memphis had perfected title in the land and that the statute of
limitations barred Murdock’s suit.28
On review, the Supreme Court concluded that the issue–-whether
Murdock retained an interest in the land under the original
conveyance–-was one of state law.29
Furthermore, the Court
concluded that it lacked authority to review a state court’s
determination of a state law issue.30 The Court based this second
conclusion on its interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 178931 and the
1867 amendment to the Act.32 The original 1789 Judiciary Act
included an explicit prohibition on judicial authority to review state
court rulings on state law issues,33 whereas the 1867 amendments
contained no such prohibition.34 The Court, nevertheless, concluded
22. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
23. See id. at 638 (finding that the Court had no authority to inquire whether the state’s
decision was correct because the claim of right was based on state equity jurisprudence).
24. See id. at 596.
25. See id. at 597.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 598 (sustaining a demurrer and affirming the decree to restore title to the
City).
29. See id. at 638 (stating that the cause of action was grounded in “equity jurisprudence,
and unaffected by anything found in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).
30. See id. (concluding that the Court had no authority to inquire about the soundness of
the state court decision).
31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
32. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 386-87.
33. See Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 630 (explaining that the Judiciary Act of 1789 formed
a system of appellate jurisprudence that limits the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to the
correction of state courts’ errors in interpreting federal law).
34. See id. at 630 (stating that, despite the fact that the Act of 1867 lacked the restrictive
clause that was present in the Act of 1789, the Supreme Court had power only to review state
court judgments that reflected an erroneous view of federal law).
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that Congress intended to prohibit Supreme Court review of state
court rulings on state law issues.35 Thus, in Murdock, the Supreme
Court declined to review the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme
Court on the state law issues.36
Despite Murdock’s holding that the Supreme Court has no power to
review state court determinations of state law,37 there are numerous
instances in which the Supreme Court has engaged in this type of
review.38 In particular, there are two types of review of state law the
Supreme Court may undertake: (1) review of the merits of the state
law question (“state law merits review”);39 and (2) review of the
federal questions in the case (“federal question review”).40 Federal
question review includes both jurisdictional review41 and substantive
federal question review.42
1.

State law merits review
State law merits review involves a complete substantive review of
the merits of the state court’s state law holding.43 For example, in
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,44 the Court reviewed a determination

35. See id. (declining to infer that Congress undertook a “radical and hazardous change of
a policy vital in its essential nature to the independence of the State courts” from the omission
of a clause found in the earlier version of the statute).
36. See id. at 638 (stating that because the claim of right is unaffected by anything found in
the Constitution or laws of the United States, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
must be affirmed).
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 (1992) (finding
that the Supreme Court had authority to exercise plenary review because the plaintiff had
alleged an “injury-in-fact” sufficient for standing under Article III); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 482-83 (1942) (holding that the case was properly appealed to the
Supreme Court because it involved the issue of whether a state motor vehicle fuel tax conflicted
with the United States Constitution by imposing “a burden upon instrumentalities or agencies
of the United States”); State Tax Comm’n of Utah v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1939)
(deciding that appellate jurisdiction was proper where the state court’s decision was based on
an interpretation of the United States Constitution and not an independent interpretation of
state income tax law); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938) (finding that
the Supreme Court may review a state court’s state law determination where the state court
decided adversely to the federal right); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 380
(1816) (establishing for the first time that it was Congress’s intent that the appellate power of
the Supreme Court extend to the review of state court judgments).
39. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (describing instances when the Court will
undertake a review of the merits of a state court decision).
40. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the propriety of Supreme Court
review of state court decisions when both federal and state law questions were present).
41. See infra notes 65-70, 84 and accompanying text (explaining that jurisdictional review of
state court decisions that contain federal issues should be reviewed by the Supreme Court).
42. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (providing illustrative examples of
substantive federal question review).
43. See Brand, 303 U.S at 98-104 (reviewing the merits of the Indiana Supreme Court’s
holding on state law issues as well as federal questions and reversing its judgment).
44. 303 U.S. 95 (1938), rev’g 5 N.E.2d 913 (Ind. 1937).

1999]

STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE

1059

of the Indiana Supreme Court regarding state law contract rights.45
In that case, a teacher brought suit claiming that the state had
interfered unconstitutionally with her contract rights by firing her.46
The issue was whether, under state law, there was a valid contract.47
The state supreme court had concluded that, under state law, the
plaintiff did not have a contract.48 The Supreme Court, however,
reviewed Indiana state law and concluded that there was a contract.49
The Court stated that “in order that the constitutional mandate may
not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for ourselves
whether a contract was made, what are its terms and conditions, and
whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its obligation.”50
Thus, the Court assumed the power to review the merits of state
courts’ rulings on state law when a federal right is premised on state
law.51
The Supreme Court has not determined whether a constitutional
principle dictates the circumstances in which the Supreme Court may
review the state law determinations made by state courts. An easy way
to explain the cases in which the Supreme Court undertakes review
of state court determinations of state law is to say that the
Constitution simply does not limit the Supreme Court’s power to
review state court determinations of state law at all. The only
constitutional limits on the Court’s power to review state court
determinations of state law, the argument goes, are those imposed by
Article III’s justiciability requirements.52 Indeed, the holding in
Murdock was not based on the Constitution, but rather on the Court’s
interpretation of the Judiciary Act and the 1867 amending statute.53
45. See id. at 98 (deciding that the issue before the court was whether, under Indiana law, a
public school teacher had a vested contract right).
46. See id. at 97.
47. See id. at 98.
48. See id. at 100 (remarking that the Supreme Court of Indiana found that a valid contract
did not exist because it is the state’s policy not to bind schools by contract for more than one
year).
49. See id. at 104 (finding that the petitioner had a valid contract, the obligation of which
was impaired by her termination).
50. Id. at 100.
51. See id. (stating that when a state court entertains a case premised on a federal right and
decides that case adversely based on state law, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the
case); see also Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) (stating that
where the constitutional protection invoked in a particular case may be denied on state
grounds, it is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to evaluate the merits of the state
decision).
52. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1295 (noting that the text of Article III neither
extends power to state courts over federal cases nor provides for Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over state decisions and concluding therefrom that Article III may not be regarded
as the basis for the State Grounds Doctrine).
53. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (presenting the Court’s rationale for
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Thus, Murdock did not establish that the Constitution limits the
Court’s review of state court determinations of state law.
Murdock neither established nor negated a constitutional limitation
on the Court’s jurisdiction. The Murdock decision held that the
Judiciary Act’s 1867 amendment did not confer Supreme Court
jurisdiction to review state court holdings based on state law.54
Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether it would
be constitutional for federal courts to review state court decisions
based on state law.55 Moreover, the argument that the Constitution
contains no limitation on the Supreme Court’s power to review state
court determinations of state law is inconsistent with the
constitutional nature of the federal courts as courts of limited
jurisdiction.56 Although Article III gives the Supreme Court power
over certain cases involving issues of state law, such as cases involving
diversity of citizenship,57 no blanket grant of jurisdiction to review all
state law determinations by state courts exists. Indeed, Article III’s
specific jurisdictional grants have been held to exclude jurisdiction
over matters not specifically listed.58 Furthermore, although the
Court has power under Article III59 and the Supremacy Clause60 to
review state law determinations that allegedly violate federal law, this
power is not necessarily so broad as to include the power to review a
state court’s interpretation of state law that does not implicate federal
law.
Significantly, the constitutionality of the State Grounds Doctrine
does not depend on whether the Constitution or federal statutory or
common law is the basis of the limitations on Supreme Court review

adhering to the State Grounds Doctrine despite Congress’s omission of a restrictive clause in
the Act of 1867).
54 . See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 633 (1874) (reserving the
question of whether, if Congress had conferred to the Supreme Court authority to review all
determinations of state law through the Act of 1867, the statute would be unconstitutional).
55. See id.
56. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (explaining that the federal courts’
jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution and by acts of Congress, while the jurisdiction of state
courts is not so limited).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that the judicial power extends to
“Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States”).
58. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 318 (1810) (concluding that
Article III’s specific grant of diversity jurisdiction implicitly excludes federal jurisdiction over
disputes between citizens of the same state absent a federal question).
59. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing Article III’s grant of power to
entertain cases arising under federal law, the Constitution, and cases involving citizens from
different states).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States shall be the “supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby” despite an existing conflict with state law).
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of state court determinations of state law.61 Whether a state law
determination by a state court is reviewable by the Supreme Court is a
threshold issue that the Court must resolve before the State Grounds
Doctrine is implicated.62 For example, if the Court deems a state law
holding reviewable on the merits, then the federal issues are fully
reviewable by the Supreme Court because a live controversy exists as
to the state and federal issues that underlie the state court’s
judgment.63 In other words, there is a substantial likelihood that a
Supreme Court decision would have an impact on the outcome of
the case.64 On the other hand, if the Supreme Court determines that
the state law issues are unreviewable–-regardless of whether the
decision not to review state law is based on the Constitution or
federal statutory or common law–-then the question arises as to
whether justiciable federal questions are presented for Supreme
Court review.65
2.

Federal question review
The second type of review of state law that the Supreme Court
might undertake is federal question review. Federal question review
includes both jurisdictional review and substantive federal question
review. On federal jurisdictional review, the Supreme Court assesses
the independence and adequacy of state law to bar the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction to review the case.66

61. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (explaining that the constitutionality of
Supreme Court review of state court decisions is derived from the Court’s power to entertain
cases and controversies involving the laws of the United States, rather than from the statutory or
common law rules surrounding the State Grounds Doctrine).
62. In particular, the Court must first determine if the state issues are subject to merits
review. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98-99 (1938) (stating that the
Supreme Court must ascertain whether a federal question was raised and resolved in the state
court and whether the state court decision rested on an adequate non-federal ground). If the
state issues are not subject to a merits review, then the two inquiries of the State Grounds
Doctrine-–independence and adequacy-–must be undertaken to determine whether the party
invoking the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction has a sufficient personal interest in the litigation to
have satisfied the Article III case and controversy requirement. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
63. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983) (stating that when matters of state
law are bound up and entangled with federal rights, the Supreme Court is free to review the
state law rulings along with the federal law rulings).
64. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (noting that the Supreme Court may only
review a state court’s judgment if its interpretation of laws at issue would have an impact on the
judgment in the case).
65. If the Court concludes that the unreviewable state grounds provide a basis for the
decision that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the state court’s judgment,
the Supreme Court, in essence, has determined that its decision of the federal issues in the case
will have no impact and the redressability element of standing is not satisfied. In other words,
there is not a substantial likelihood that the Court’s judgment will have an impact.
66. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (describing what state grounds are
sufficiently “independent” and “adequate” to preclude review by the Supreme Court).
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It is necessary to distinguish jurisdictional review from merits
review of state law. When the Supreme Court reviews the merits of
state law, as in Brand, the Court essentially determines that even
though the state court concluded that state law is ‘X’, the state court
erred and state law is really ‘Y’.67 When the Supreme Court
undertakes jurisdictional review of the adequacy and independence
of state law, however, it does not assess the merits of the state court’s
determination of state law. Instead, the Court determines whether
the state court’s decision impinges on federal rights in such a way as
to raise a federal question, or is entwined with federal law in a way
that suggests that Supreme Court review of the federal issues (and a
decision in favor of the party seeking Supreme Court review) is likely
to result in reversal of the state court’s judgment.68 The Court
essentially determines that the state court’s conclusion that state law
is ‘X’ is inadequate to preclude Supreme Court review of the federal
issues because ‘X’ arguably infringes upon a federal right (or,
because the conclusion ‘X’ is not independent of federal law).69 This
is a federal question.70
The other type of Supreme Court review of state law is a substantive
federal question analysis. In particular, whenever review is necessary
to protect the supremacy of federal law and ensure that state law does
not infringe on federal rights, the Supreme Court will engage freely
in the review of the state court decisions.71 The Court firmly
established this principle in Cohens v. Virginia.72 In Cohens, two
brothers were convicted in Virginia state court of selling District of
Columbia lottery tickets in Virginia, a violation of Virginia law.73 The
67. See, e.g., Brand, 303 U.S. at 98 (concluding that a contract had been formed under
Indiana law, despite the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination to the contrary).
68. See infra notes 85-123 and accompanying text (explaining the independence and
adequacy inquiries of the State Grounds Doctrine, both of which are focused primarily on the
determination of whether the Supreme Court’s decision on the federal questions in the case
would mandate a reversal of the state court’s judgment).
69. The Court might conclude that ‘X’ is not sufficiently independent of federal law as to
preclude review of the federal issues. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 n.4 (1983)
(noting that in some cases the federal ground may be so interwoven with the state ground that
the state ground is simply not “independent”).
70. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 320-29 (1821) (discussing the
jurisdiction to determine whether the state law was construed based on the Court’s
interpretation of federal law). It must be noted, however, that jurisdictional review itself cannot
serve as the basis of justiciability. Standing and lack of mootness cannot be predicated on the
presence of a live dispute regarding the adequacy of the state law ground of decision or its
independence from federal law. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (stating that
issues of mootness and standing are federal questions that the Court must ultimately decide).
71. See Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893) (explaining that state law that interferes
with or infringes upon a federal right is not adequate to support the judgment of a state court).
72. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
73. See id. at 267.
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brothers sought review in the Supreme Court, claiming that the
United States Constitution prohibited the conviction because
Congress had authorized the lottery tickets.74 The Supreme Court
concluded that it had the constitutional and statutory authority to
review the conviction to ensure the protection of federal rights.75
Thus, a state law that interferes with or infringes on a federal right is
not adequate to support the judgment of a state court.76
B. Adequacy and Independence: Supreme Court Review of State Court
Determinations of Federal Issues
Although the Court, in Murdock, interpreted the jurisdictional
statute to preclude review of a state court’s determination of state
law,77 it expressly preserved its power to review federal issues.78 Since
Murdock, the Court has consistently held that it may not review state
court determinations of federal law issues in cases that involve both
federal and state law issues when the state court’s decision rests
independently on adequate state law.79 In Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,80
the Court stated that “where the judgment of a state court rests upon
two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in
character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the
judgment.”81
74. See id. at 289.
75. See id. at 415 (finding it essential that the Supreme Court review state court judgments
that contravene the Constitution). In addition, the Court concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar the Court’s review of state criminal convictions. See id. at 412.
Although the Court in Cohens did not explicitly undertake adequacy review, the conclusion that
state law was inadequate to support the state court’s judgment was inherent in the Court’s
analysis. See id. at 444 (stating that although the validity of the Virginia law that punishes a
citizen of Virginia for purchasing a lottery ticket in the city of Washington, D.C. was suspect, the
Supreme Court must first determine whether the state law decision infringed a federal right).
The Court did not review the merits of the Virginia court’s conclusion on Virginia law, but
instead reviewed, as a matter of federal law, whether that conclusion impinged a federal right
and was therefore invalid. See id. at 429.
76. See id. at 415 (finding the exercise of appellate power over state court judgments that
contravene federal law essential to the interests of the nation).
77. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874) (stating that state
courts, not federal courts, are the appropriate tribunals for deciding questions of state common
and statutory law).
78. The Murdock Court stated:
[B]y the very terms of this statute, when the Supreme Court is of opinion that the
question of Federal law is of such relative importance to the whole case that it should
control the final judgment, that court is authorized to render such judgment and
enforce it by its own process.
Id. at 632.
79. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (refusing to review a state court opinion
because it was based on independent and adequate state grounds).
80. 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
81. Id. at 210; see also Herb, 324 U.S. at 125 (stating that “[t]his Court from the time of its
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Properly understood, the State Grounds Doctrine operates as a
limitation on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review questions of
federal law when the Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court
rulings based on state law.82 The independence and adequacy
inquiries of the State Grounds Doctrine constitute jurisdictional
review to determine whether the federal issues are justiciable despite
a purported state ground of decision.83 Whether the state law ground
of decision is independent of federal law and adequate to support the
state court’s judgment is a federal question.84
1.

Adequacy
A state law ground of decision is “adequate” if the Supreme Court’s
judgment on the federal issues would have no impact on the state
court’s judgment.85 For a state ground of decision to adequately
support the state court’s judgment, the state ground must be broad
enough to support the state court’s judgment86 and must apply
consistently to various litigants.87 In addition, a state court may not
foundation has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state courts that
rest on adequate and independent state grounds”); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893)
(pronouncing that the Supreme Court must not overturn a state court judgment unless a
federal question was essential to the determination of the case and also that the outcome was
adverse to the party claiming a right under the federal laws or Constitution) (citing Murdock, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) at 593); Cook County v. Calumet & Chicago Canal Co., 138 U.S. 635, 651 (1891)
(resolving that to confer federal jurisdiction over a state court ruling, it must affirmatively
appear that there was a federal question necessary to the determination of the case and that
judgment could not have been rendered without it).
82. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (explaining that the State
Grounds Doctrine is based on the limitations of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, such as the
prohibition on issuing advisory opinions and the Article III case and controversy requirement).
83. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (describing jurisdictional review).
84. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (stating that the issue of whether and
when the Court may review state decisions because of noncompliance with state procedural
rules is itself a federal question); see also Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32, 33-34 (1924) (holding that
where there is an assertion of federal rights in a lower court, the issue of whether those rights
were denied presents a federal question for the Supreme Court).
85. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5.2, at 619 (describing an adequate state law
ground as one which is “sufficient by itself to support the judgment, regardless of whether the
federal law issue is affirmed or reversed”); Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1292-93 n.2 (stating
that a decision based on state law is adequate if the judgment in the case would be affirmed
even if any decision on federal law were reversed).
86. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 n.4 (1983) (noting that Supreme Court
review is appropriate “‘where the non-federal ground . . . is not of sufficient breadth to sustain
the judgment without any decision of the [federal ground]’”) (quoting Enterprise Irrigation
Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917)).
87. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991) (stating that for an adequate and
independent state procedural rule to bar appellate review of constitutional claims, that rule
must have been followed consistently); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982)
(explaining that a state procedural ground is not “adequate” unless the procedural rule at issue
had been applied evenhandedly to all claims of the same type); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (ruling that “state procedural requirements which are not strictly or
regularly followed cannot deprive us of the right to review”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958) (noting that states’ novel procedural requirements must
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exercise discretion to preclude federal review of federal issues.88
These requirements ensure that the state ground is genuine rather
than designed to deprive the Supreme Court of review.89
A state substantive ground of decision generally will be adequate if
it does not impinge on a federal right.90 The adequacy of a state
procedural ground, however, is more problematic.91 For example, in
Henry v. Mississippi,92 the Supreme Court held that a state procedural
ground will be adequate to foreclose Supreme Court review only if
the procedural ground serves a legitimate state purpose.93 Whether a
legitimate state purpose supports a state procedural rule that is
applied to preclude Supreme Court consideration of a federal
question is, according to Henry, “itself a federal question.”94 Thus, the
state procedural rule that purports to foreclose Supreme Court
review of a federal claim always implicates a federal question, and the

not impede the Supreme Court’s ability to review the claims of those who chose to vindicate
their federal rights in state courts).
88. See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383 (1955) (remarking that it would exceed the
discretion of a state court to refuse to hear a litigant’s constitutional claim while simultaneously
entertaining other issues in the case).
89. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5, at 626 (noting the concern that state courts
might try to immunize their decisions from Supreme Court review by creating a novel
procedural hurdle or applying a rule that is rarely followed, thereby giving rise to a seemingly
adequate state law ground for decision).
90. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415 (1821) (establishing the Supreme
Court’s power to review state law that infringes a federal right). In cases involving substantive
state law that allegedly is “inadequate” to preclude federal court review of the federal issues, the
inadequacy is often apparent and the Court need not undertake extensive analysis regarding
the adequacy of state law. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41 (stating that when a state court decision
seems to be based on federal law and when the adequacy of the state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, the Supreme Court will assume that the state court’s decision was
based on its interpretation of the federal law at issue). Rather, the Court assumes the
inadequacy and addresses the federal question. See id. Thus, whenever review is necessary to
protect the supremacy of federal law and ensure that state law is not infringing on federal
rights, the Supreme Court will engage freely in review of the decisions of state courts. See id. at
1041. When the Supreme Court reviews state court decisions in this context, however, it is not
reviewing the merits of state law, but is assessing the validity of state law vis-à-vis federal law.
91. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (emphasizing the need to distinguish
between state substantive and procedural law in determining whether there is an independent
and adequate state ground for the decision). A number of commentators, however, have
argued that there should be no difference in analyzing the adequacy of a state substantive or
procedural ground. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State
Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 197 (arguing that the substanceprocedure distinction “has a surface plausibility that, on further examination fails to withstand
analysis”); Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law
and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977) (arguing that “the
problem of federal-state relations is the same . . . whether the antecedent state law issue is
substantive or procedural”).
92. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
93. See id. at 447 (deciding that in every case the Court must inquire whether a state
procedural right serves a legitimate state interest before it undertakes review of whether that
procedural right impinges a federal right).
94. See id.
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Court’s review is always appropriate to assess whether a state’s
procedural rule is adequate to foreclose review of a federal question.95
This does not mean that the Court never will uphold and enforce
the state court’s procedural holding. On the contrary, there are
sound reasons for upholding state procedural rules, including
efficiency,96 predictability,97 and finality.98 A state procedural rule,
however, may not preclude review of a federal right without
implicating a question of federal law as to the legitimate state interest
served by the procedural rule.99 This principle serves the important
federal interest of not permitting states to manufacture procedural
impediments to frustrate federal rights.100
2.

Independence
Similar to the adequacy inquiry, the independence inquiry of the
State Grounds Doctrine focuses primarily on the determination of
whether the Supreme Court’s resolution of the federal issues involved
in the case will affect the state court’s judgment.101
The
independence prong examines whether the state supreme court
based its holding on state law that is insulated from federal review, or
whether the state law issues were dependent on and intertwined with
federal law.102 Federal issues do not impact a state court judgment
that is based entirely on state law and is not intertwined with the
federal law issues or dependent on the state court’s interpretation of
federal law.103
In Michigan v. Long,104 the Court attempted to clarify the
circumstances justifying Supreme Court review of state court
95. See id.
96. See 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4021, at 302 (stating that efficiency is promoted
by permitting states to develop and apply “a uniform and integrated set of rules to litigation in a
single case”).
97. See id. (stating that allowing the state courts to apply state procedural rules enables
state courts and local counsel, who are familiar with state procedural rules, to identify and apply
the correct procedural rules).
98. See id. (noting that the interest in finality underlies all procedural rules and allowing a
state court to apply its own procedural rules enables the state to control and predict litigation in
state court with the finality necessary to protect litigants and the court’s judgments).
99. See id. § 4021, at 303 (stating that there is no reason to consider state procedural rules
more seriously than federal rules if the former could justify refusal of the federal question).
100. See Henry, 379 U.S. at 447 (stating that allowing a state procedural rule to preclude
review of a federal right “prevents implementation of the federal right”).
101. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5.3, at 630 (noting that a state ground of decision
will not be deemed independent unless it was explicitly relied upon by the state court to the
exclusion of any interpretation of federal laws at issue).
102. See id. (explaining what constitutes an independent state ground for decision).
103. See id. (stating that a state ground will be considered independent only if it is based
entirely on state law and is not tied to federal law).
104. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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judgments.105 The Court noted three instances when Supreme Court
review of a state court’s judgment is available despite the presence of
state law issues in the case: (1) if the state court decided the case on
a federal ground even though a state ground of decision was
available, but not relied upon by the state court;106 (2) if the state
court “‘felt compelled by what it understood to be federal
constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the
manner that it did’”;107 and (3) “‘where the non-federal ground is so
interwoven with the [federal ground] as not to be an independent
matter.’”108 Each of these circumstances describes a situation in
which the state ground of decision is not sufficiently independent of
the federal ground so as to preclude Supreme Court review.109
In some cases, it is unclear whether the state court intended its
interpretation of state law to be independent of federal law. This
uncertainty is present when the state court discusses federal law in
the course of resolving the state issues or discusses both state and
federal law issues but does not make the basis of its decision
explicit.110
The Supreme Court’s approach in such situations has evolved over
time.111 For example, beginning with Eustis v. Bolles112 in 1893 and
105. See id. at 1039 (noting the inadequacy of using an ad hoc method to determine the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review state court decisions that involve federal issues).
106. See id. at 1039 n.4 (stating that if the state court acted according to its interpretation of
the federal interests at issue, then there would be no question as to the appropriateness of
federal jurisdiction) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652 (1979)); see also Beecher v.
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n.3 (1967) (concluding that the Supreme Court could exercise
jurisdiction over a state court decision if the state court relied on federal law as the basis of its
judgment despite an adequate and available state ground).
107. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 n.4 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653); see also South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 n.5 (1983) (reviewing federal issues because the state court relied on
its interpretation of federal law in interpreting its own state law); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 652-53
(concluding that “at the very least the [Delaware] court felt compelled by what it understood to
be federal constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the manner it did”).
108. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 n.4 (quoting Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal
Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917)). This ground for review is quite similar to the justification the
Court has given for reviewing the state law issues themselves. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (reviewing state court determinations of state law contract rights
“in order that the constitutional mandate” of the contract clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, “may
not become a dead letter”). Brand supports the proposition that when matters of state law are
bound up and entangled with federal rights, the Supreme Court is free to review the state law
rulings along with the federal law rulings. See generally id. at 96 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review state court judgments when the state court judgments are not based on an
independent state ground).
109. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (describing the three instances in which
a state court decision is so linked with federal issues that it triggers Supreme Court review of the
state court judgment).
110. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5.3, at 632 (stating that a crucial issue is how the
State Grounds Doctrine applies in cases where it is unclear whether the state law ground
incorporates federal law or whether it is intended to be an independent basis for decision).
111. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (stating that before the decision in
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continuing until 1940, the Court employed the presumption that the
state ground of decision was independent of federal law.113 In 1940,
the Supreme Court shifted its approach and began vacating the state
court’s judgment and remanding for clarification of the basis of the
state court’s decision.114 Shortly thereafter, the Court again changed
its approach and would grant either a continuance and require the
petitioner to obtain clarification from the state court,115 or a review of
the state court’s opinion to determine whether the state court
intended to base its decision on independent state law.116
Subsequently, in Michigan v. Long,117 the Court articulated a new
approach in ambiguous ground cases. Under the Long approach, a
state court may insulate its decision from Supreme Court review by
including a plain statement of an independent state law basis for its
decision.118 Absent such a plain statement, the Supreme Court will
assume that the state court did not intend to base its decision on
independent state grounds and will review the federal issues.119 The
Court characterized Long as creating a “conclusive presumption”120
that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the federal issues
notwithstanding a state ground of decision unless the state court
included a clear and express statement that its decision was “based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds.”121 This
Long, the Supreme Court had adopted various inconsistent and unsatisfactory courses of action
for responding to ambiguous state court decisions, including dismissal of the case, remand to
the state court for clarification, and independent investigations of state law).
112. 150 U.S. 361 (1893).
113. See id. at 367 (stating that “if the independent state ground on which [the state court
decision] might have been based was a good and valid one . . . this court will not assume
jurisdiction of the case . . .”); see also Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 55 (1934)
(dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the record failed to show
Supreme Court jurisdiction).
114. See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (vacating the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Minnesota because the judgment did not rest on an independent
interpretation of state law).
115. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (emphasizing the need for clarification
from the state courts when their basis for decision was unclear).
116. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that the Delaware Supreme
Court based its decision regarding the legality of an officer’s stop and subsequent arrest of an
individual for possession of marijuana on Delaware’s Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977) (noting that an
Ohio Supreme Court decision regarding the unlawful appropriation of professional property
rested solely on federal grounds).
117. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
118. See id. at 1041 (stating that the inclusion of a plain statement in a state court’s decision
when it relies on federal precedents for guidance will insulate the decision from federal court
review).
119. See id. at 1042 (explaining that the Court will determine expressly its authority to review
a case based on the inclusion or absence of a plain statement in the state court’s opinion).
120. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991).
121. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. The Court further stated that when a state court judgment
seems to be grounded primarily in federal law and when the adequacy and independence of
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view promotes the federalism interest underlying the State Grounds
Doctrine insofar as it permits state courts to insulate their opinions
from Supreme Court review simply by including the required plain
statement in their opinions.122
Arguably, however, the Long
presumption is inconsistent with the Court’s obligation to monitor its
own jurisdiction.123
C. The Rationale for the State Grounds Doctrine
Primary justifications for the State Grounds Doctrine include
respect for state courts’ autonomy (the “federalism rationale”),124 the
avoidance of unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions (the

the state law ground is unclear from the state court’s opinion, the Court will assume that the
state court reached its decision because its interpretation of federal law mandated that
outcome. See id. at 1042.
122. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1062
(1994) (noting “that state courts can use the doctrine to insulate their judgments from
Supreme Court review”). But see Felicia A. Rosenfeld, Note, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v.
Long: The State Court Reaction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1041, 1042 (1988) (concluding, on the basis
of an exhaustive study of state courts’ reactions to Long, that “most state courts fail to indicate
clearly the basis for their constitutional rulings” despite Long’s plain statement rule).
123. Justice O’Connor noted in her majority opinion in Long, that “[i]t is, of course,
‘incumbent upon this Court . . . to ascertain for itself . . . whether the asserted non-federal
ground independently and adequately supports the judgment.’” Long, 463 U.S. at 1038
(quoting Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931)).
124. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739 (noting that respect for the interests of the state court
justifies the application of the independent and adequate State Grounds Doctrine in federal
habeas corpus cases); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 571 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that a presumption against appellate jurisdiction over cases decided on state grounds
preserves the respect owed to state courts); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that review of state court judgments that rest on independent
and adequate state grounds would threaten the comity between state and federal courts); Long,
463 U.S. at 1040 (fashioning a presumption for assessing the independence of state grounds of
decision, which would allow the Court to avoid scrutinizing the state’s law and be more
“respectful” of the state court); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting that “once the Court determines that a state ground is adequate and independent, ‘the
Constitutional limit of [the Court’s] power in this sphere’ has been reached [because] the
Constitution . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states”)
(quoting Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)) (citing Erie v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938)); Willis v. Aiken, 8 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Long
holding was based on “avoid[ance of] the federal judiciary’s becoming enmeshed unnecessarily
in state decisional law . . .”); see also Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 953, 985-86 (1991) (explaining that the State Grounds Doctrine results in state court
autonomy and encourages the states to recognize rights founded upon state law instead of
federal law); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 179-80 (remarking that the State Grounds Doctrine provides a
principle for direct review that respects state court insistence on compliance with its own
procedures and thereby allows the Supreme Court to honor a state’s choices regarding
procedure); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 603, 648 (1992) (stating that the State Grounds Doctrine is premised on reasons for
avoiding judicial review, which include judicial federalism); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 77-78 (1989) (stating that the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution tacitly sanctions the State Grounds
Doctrine and other doctrines respecting the sovereignty of the states).
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“avoidance doctrine rationale”),125 and the avoidance of issuing
advisory opinions (the “advisory opinion rationale”).126
1.

Federalism rationale
The Supreme Court and various commentators have recognized
the significance of state lawmaking autonomy, and the constitutional
plan recognized the federalist nature of the American judicial system
with separate federal and state courts.127 Although the Supreme
Court undoubtedly has the power to review decisions of the state
courts under certain circumstances, inherent tensions exist.128 State
courts attempt to exercise their autonomy and create state law, while
federal courts attempt to fulfill their constitutional obligation to
protect federal rights and ensure the supremacy of federal law.129 In
an effort to manage this tension and delineate workable boundaries
in which federal and state courts can each exercise concurrent
125. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982) (noting that a
state law ground of decision enables the Court to fulfill its “policy of avoiding the unnecessary
adjudication of federal constitutional questions”); see also Kloppenberg, supra note 122, at 106165 (explaining that the State Grounds Doctrine is an application of the avoidance doctrine).
126. Many Supreme Court opinions state that the prohibition on issuing advisory opinions
justifies adherence to the State Grounds Doctrine. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523
(1997) (discussing the lack of Supreme Court jurisdiction to issue an opinion on any matter
based on an independent state ground because such an opinion would be advisory in nature);
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 (stating that Supreme Court review of a state law judgment resting on
independent state grounds essentially would be an advisory opinion); Finley, 481 U.S. at 569
(noting the Supreme Court’s apprehension of interfering with state court judgments based on
independent state grounds because the effect of its review of such cases would be that of
rendering an advisory opinion); Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310, 1311 (1984) (stating that
decisions on federal questions that arise in state court cases that rest on an independent state
ground would “amount to no more than advisory opinions”); Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. at 297
(noting the long-held view that review of state court decisions based on independent state
grounds amounts to an advisory opinion); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1965)
(expressing the Court’s inability to review a state court decision based on an independent state
ground because of the prohibition on advisory opinions); Fay, 372 U.S. at 429-30 (stating that
the State Grounds Doctrine is a consequence of the Court’s obligation not to render advisory
opinions); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (noting that the Supreme Court is
prohibited from rendering advisory opinions). But see Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1369
(arguing that the Long Court mistakenly relied on the advisory opinion rationale as the basis for
the State Grounds Doctrine); Lee, supra note 124, at 648 (arguing that the advisory opinion
rationale for the adequate and independent State Grounds Doctrine is “essentially useless,”
because the doctrine is “entirely premised on other reasons for avoiding review of such
judgments, such as judicial federalism”).
127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that states would have
concurrent powers unless prohibited therefrom); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the Constitution regards states as distinct
institutions with lawmaking authority).
128. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has
constitutional and statutory authority to review state court decisions that involve federal
questions).
129. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 260-79 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing tension between state and federal laws,
such as state tax laws and individuals’ constitutional rights to property).
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autonomy within their own sphere of authority, the Supreme Court
has articulated a number of doctrines limiting the federal courts’
reach in matters implicating the autonomy of state courts.130 The
State Grounds Doctrine is one such boundary because it enables state
courts to create a body of state law independent of federal law and
protected from federal review.131
Despite the constitutional dimension to the federalism rationale, it
is difficult to draw a constitutional line based on federalism that
explains the State Grounds Doctrine. In fact, once the State Grounds
Doctrine is implicated, concerns of limiting a state court’s freedom to
articulate state law have already given way to questions of whether the
presence and centrality of federal issues justify review of the federal
issues.132 Thus, although federalism might underlie the Court’s
decision not to review the merits of state law issues, federalism does
not justify the Court’s refusal to review the federal issues in these
cases. Importantly, the State Grounds Doctrine prohibits the
Supreme Court’s review of federal issues once it has determined that
the state law issues are unreviewable.133
Therefore, while
constitutional federalism may determine whether the Court may
review the state law issues, once that determination has been made,
federalism does not limit the Court’s review of federal issues.
2.

Avoidance doctrine rationale
The notion that the Court should avoid unnecessarily deciding

130. For example, a number of the abstention doctrines were created out of respect for the
autonomy of state courts and other aspects of state governmental autonomy and authority. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (holding that a federal court may not enjoin state
criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances where the failure to do so
would result in great and immediate irreparable injury); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
334 (1943) (ruling that a federal court should abstain in cases involving complex, uncertain
state law issues that implicate unified state administrative procedures aimed at regulating a local
problem of state public concern); Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501
(1941) (holding that a federal court should stay a federal proceeding when there is substantial
uncertainty as to state law and the state court’s clarification of the state law might enable the
federal court to avoid a federal constitutional ruling). In addition, various doctrines applicable
to habeas corpus review are designed to protect state autonomy and the ability of state courts to
obtain and protect state criminal convictions. See, e.g., Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 293-94
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing accommodation between the Fourth
Amendment and the Extradition Clause and the tension between federal and state court
jurisdiction in the context of habeas corpus review).
131. See Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750, 757
(1972) (stating that the State Grounds Doctrine permits a state court that is not motivated by a
desire for judicial economy to insulate its decision from review by any other tribunal or political
process); see also supra note 124 (citing cases recognizing the federalism rationale for the State
Grounds Doctrine).
132. See id. at 758-61 (suggesting various alternatives to alleviate Supreme Court
interference in state law, including changes in the Court’s petition for certiorari policy).
133. See id. at 756.
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constitutional questions does not provide a constitutional rationale
for the State Grounds Doctrine.134 As Justice Brandeis noted in
concurrence, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,135 a case may be
properly within the federal courts’ jurisdiction but present a
constitutional issue, the merits of which ought to be avoided as a
matter of judicial restraint.136 Undoubtedly, the State Grounds
Doctrine promotes the goal of avoiding unnecessary federal
questions.137 The avoidance doctrine rationale, however, is not of
constitutional dimension.138
3.

Advisory opinion rationale
The only basis on which the State Grounds Doctrine may be
considered constitutionally mandated is pursuant to the Article III
limitations on judicial power. The Supreme Court has referred
frequently and consistently to the advisory opinion ban as the
rationale for the State Grounds Doctrine.139 Essentially, the argument
is that if the Court were to render an opinion on an issue that would
have no impact on the outcome of the case, it would be issuing an
impermissible advisory opinion. The Supreme Court, in Herb v.
Pitcairn,140 articulated this advisory opinion rationale for the State
Grounds Doctrine:
The reason [that the Court will not review judgments of state
courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds] is
found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our
134. See Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982) (referring to the
avoidance doctrine as a “self-imposed limitation” on the Court’s jurisdiction).
135. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
136. See id. at 341-56 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing a series of rules that the Supreme
Court has adopted under which the Court may avoid answering constitutional questions
presented in a case). Certainly the federal courts are free to engage in constitutional dicta, but
deciding a case which is based on unreviewable adequate and independent state law goes
beyond constitutional dicta. The parties have lost their personal stake in the litigation and the
Court’s judgment is not substantially likely to have an impact or bring about some change. See
Lee, supra note 124, at 607 (noting that a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the
outcome of litigation to have standing in federal court). As such, the case is not properly within
the federal judicial power. See generally Bice, supra note 131, at 758 (discussing the purpose of
the State Grounds Doctrine and the lack of jurisdiction for federal court intrusion in state
matters).
137. See supra note 125 (citing authority discussing the avoidance doctrine rationale for the
State Grounds Doctrine).
138. See generally Kloppenberg, supra note 122, at 1061-65 (arguing that the avoidance
doctrine rationale is not based on a constitutional mandate).
139. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-30 (1963) (stating that “[t]he adequate state ground
rule is a consequence of the Court’s obligation to refrain from rendering advisory opinions”);
see also supra note 126 (referring to various instances in which the Supreme Court substantiated
the State Grounds Doctrine by citing the ban on advisory opinions).
140. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent
that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to
correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an
141
advisory opinion.

More recently, the Court reiterated that it lacks the power to review
a state law determination that is sufficient to support a state court
judgment because resolution of federal questions in such a case
would not affect the outcome and therefore, would amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion.142 In other words, because
the Court is without authority to review and amend the state court’s
decision on the state law issue, the Court’s analysis of the federal issue
would amount to an advisory opinion because it would have no
impact on the outcome of the case.143
Despite the Court’s consistent reliance on the advisory opinion ban
as justification for the State Grounds Doctrine, the Court never has
explained clearly why an advisory opinion results from a Supreme
Court opinion on a federal issue when the state court’s judgment
rests on independent and adequate state grounds.144 Indeed, some
commentators have rejected the advisory opinion rationale.145 For

141. Id. at 125-26.
142. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (discussing the advisory opinion
rationale for State Grounds Doctrine).
143. See id.; see also Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1984) (adopting the advisory
opinion rationale for the principle that the Supreme Court may not review some state court
judgments).
144. The Supreme Court has loosely used the term “advisory opinion” to describe not only
cases that fall outside the Article III power of the federal courts, but also to refer to matters that
for prudential reasons, the Court deems unreviewable. See Lee, supra note 124, at 644-45
(noting that the “Supreme Court has characterized advisory opinions to include: [any]
judgment subject to review by a co-equal branch of there maybe an adequate and independent
state ground of decision . . . ; dicta; [and] [a]ny decision on the merits of a case that is moot or
unripe, or in which one of the parties lacks standing,” and arguing that only the first two
represent advisory opinions in the constitutional sense).
145. See 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4021, at 293 (calling the advisory opinion
rationale “circular and misdescriptive”). Another argument that the State Grounds Doctrine is
not constitutionally required suggests that review of state court judgments containing both
federal and non-federal issues is no different than reviewing the judgment of a lower federal
court. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1296-97. It could not seriously be contended that if
a lower federal court bases its judgment on a state law ground the case is nonjusticiable in the
Supreme Court because all the issues presented in the case are fully reviewable by the Supreme
Court; there is no bar to the Supreme Court’s review of the state law judgments of a lower
federal court. See id. The concerns of federalism and lack of statutory authority that lead the
Supreme Court to refrain from reviewing state court judgments on state law issues are simply
not present when the Supreme Court is reviewing a federal court’s determination of a state law
issue. See id. Therefore, the standing and mootness requirements are satisfied when a case
comes to the Supreme Court from a lower federal court.
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example, Richard Matasar and Gregory Bruch have argued that the
primary features of the advisory opinion ban—“ensuring an
adversarial presentation of actual disputes” and “promoting finality of
judicial action essential to the maintenance of separation of powers
within the national system”—would not be offended by Supreme
Court review of federal issues despite an independent and adequate
state law basis for a state court’s judgment.146 Thus, it is necessary to
explore the advisory opinion rationale and determine why the State
Grounds Doctrine implicates the constitutional ban on advisory
opinions. Part II of this Article explains why, with reference to the
Article III standing requirement and mootness doctrine, which
represent the Court’s doctrinal implementation of the advisory
opinion ban, the State Grounds Doctrine is a consequence of the
constitutional limitations on the federal judicial power.
II. JUSTICIABILITY AND THE STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE
Article III limits the federal judicial power to “cases” and
“controversies.”147 The Supreme Court has stated that the case and
controversy limitation serves two purposes: (1) to ensure that issues
are presented in an adversary context capable of resolution by the
judiciary;148 and (2) to promote separation of powers.149
The core of Article III’s case and controversy requirement is the
ban on advisory opinions. The Supreme Court has distinguished a
justiciable controversy from a non-justiciable advisory opinion as
follows:
A “controversy” in [the Article III] sense must be one that is
appropriate for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is
thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or
abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. The
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
150
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
146. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1302 (noting the historical context which suggests
the purpose of the advisory opinion ban).
147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
148. See United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1980) (discussing
the effects of the case and controversy limitation).
149. See id. at 396 (stating that the case and controversy requirement “defines the ‘role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government’”) (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
150. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (defining justiciable
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A justiciable case requires an actual dispute between adverse
litigants and a substantial likelihood that a favorable federal court
decision will have an effect.151 The first requirement, that there be an
actual dispute between adverse litigants, stems from the Supreme
Court Justices’ response to then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson’s
1793 request for advice on several questions of relevance to President
Washington’s administration.152 Justice Jay’s response, which was
delivered to President Washington on behalf of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, stated firmly that the Constitution prohibited the
rendering of advice in the form sought.153
The second requirement, that there be a substantial likelihood that
a favorable judgment will have some effect, stems from Hayburn’s
Case.154 In Hayburn’s Case, Congress authorized the federal courts to
review claims for Revolutionary War veterans’ benefits and make
recommendations to the Secretary of War,155 who was free to
disregard the federal courts’ recommendations.156 Although the
Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the procedure
at issue, five of the six Supreme Court Justices concluded that the
procedure was “not of a judicial nature.”157
controversy for purposes of upholding the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2202
(West 1994 & Supp. 1999)).
151. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 2.2, at 52 (stating that Article III’s case or
controversy requirement means that “there must be an actual dispute between adverse litigants,
and there must be a substantial likelihood that a favorable court decision will have some
effect”).
152. See Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8,
1793), reprinted in STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES
app. at 179-80 (1997) (responding to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson’s request for answers
to legal questions by maintaining that the Constitution divides power between the three
branches of government and that the judicial branch may not provide advice to the President).
153. The 1793 letter from the Justices stated in part:
The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of
Government–-their being in certain Respects checks upon each other–-and our being
Judges of a court in the last Resort–-are Considerations which afford strong arguments
against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to;
especially as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the
Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly
limited to the executive Departments.
Id., reprinted in STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES
app. at 179-80 (1997).
154. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
155. See id. at 410 (analyzing whether Congress had the right to assign the judicial branch
the duty of distributing benefits to widows, orphans, and invalid veterans because this duty is
not included in the constitutional description of judicial duties).
156. See id. (considering the Court’s ability to review an act of Congress that provided
Revolutionary War veterans with pensions pursuant to federal circuit court review and
affirmation or reversal of that review by the Secretary of War).
157. See id. at 411; see also Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110-11
(1948) (holding nonjusticiable claims for review of Civil Aeronautics Board rulings because the
President had statutory power to review and reject the federal court’s ruling); United States v.
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Despite occasional arguments to the contrary,158 the view that
Article III excludes from the properly limited role of the Supreme
Court the power to provide advisory opinions is well supported by the
debates at the Constitutional Convention159 and has never been
questioned seriously by the Supreme Court.160 Indeed, the advisory
opinion ban—encompassing the requirement that there be an actual
dispute between adverse litigants in which there is a substantial
likelihood that a favorable judgment will have an impact—goes
directly to the twin purposes of the case and controversy requirement
itself. The requirement limits the “business of the federal courts to
‘questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process,’”161 and promotes separation of powers by “assur[ing] that
Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 39, 48 (1851) (holding nonjusticiable claims under a federal statute
which provided for judicial review of war damage claims against the United States, but making
the federal courts’ determinations subject to review and revision by the Secretary of the
Treasury). But see Lee, supra note 124, at 647 n.246 (arguing that Hayburn’s Case should be
interpreted more narrowly to preclude the exercise of federal judicial power only when the
judgment of the federal court would be subject to review or revision by a coordinate branch of
the federal government).
158. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 54 (1972) (commenting that if Jefferson’s
questions to the Court had been of a different character–-i.e., easier to answer–-or at a less tense
moment in history, the Justices’ response might have been materially different and would have
changed the evolution of the advisory opinion ban as a central defining tenant of the federal
judicial power); Lee, supra note 124, at 644-51 (arguing that although there is a constitutional
dimension to the advisory opinion ban, “the Court has been extremely sloppy in its use of the
phrase ‘advisory opinions,’” and many of the scenarios in which the Court has used the term
“advisory opinions” do not invoke the constitutional ban on advisory opinions); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical
Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 474 (1998) (arguing that although constitutional and political
theory impacted the Justices’ reaction to Jefferson’s inquiry, political ideology was the primary
influence).
159. See Comment, The Advisory Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 5 FORDHAM L.
REV. 94, 101-02 (1936) (noting a suggestion at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to adopt a
provision “allowing the Executive to obtain advisory opinions from the Supreme Court” that was
not incorporated into the Constitution).
160. See id. at 103. The Comment describes two “extraordinary incident[s]” in which the
Supreme Court appears to have varied from its position on the impropriety of issuing advisory
opinions. See id. First, in 1822, President Monroe drafted a pamphlet that expressed his
negative views regarding a bill that would have extended federal power over turnpikes within
state boundaries and he sent a copy of this pamphlet to the Justices of the Supreme Court. See
id. Justice Marshall responded, expressing his agreement with President Monroe’s views. See id.
Justice Story acknowledged receipt of the pamphlet without expressing an opinion on the views
expressed by the President. See id. Thereafter, Justice Johnson, in consultation with other
Justices, forwarded a joint opinion to the President addressing the issues raised in the
pamphlet. See id. The second incident occurred in 1877 when the result of the Hayes-Tilden
election was in question. Congress created an Electoral Commission to decide the result of the
election. See id. The members of the Commission were five Justices of the Supreme Court.
Each member of the Commission–-i.e., each Supreme Court Justice-–voted along his own
political party lines and implicitly provided an advisory opinion as to the substantive issues
required to resolve the dispute surrounding the election. See id.
161. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (quoting Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
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the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.”162 In short, the advisory opinion ban, in its
constitutional form, limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
matters of a judicial nature.163
When a judgment rests on adequate and independent state
grounds,164 a Supreme Court determination of the federal issues
would amount to an advisory opinion165 because there is no actual
dispute between adverse litigants,166 and there is not a substantial
likelihood that a Supreme Court decision resolving the federal issues
would have an effect.167 Thus, these cases fail to satisfy the Article III
case or controversy requirement.168
Some commentators have suggested that a Supreme Court opinion
may be “rendered advisory” when, on remand to the state court, the
state court reinstates its original judgment.169 This view, however,
misconstrues the nature of the advisory opinion ban.170 The State
162. Id.
163. In his report on the constitutional debates, James Madison noted that the federal
judicial power was “constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.” See 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966); see also Hayburn’s
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 (1792) (concluding that it would not be appropriate for federal
courts to consider and rule on Revolutionary War veterans’ benefits claims when the courts’
determinations would be subject to review and revision by the Secretary of War, because such
action by the federal courts was not “of a judicial nature”). But see Lee, supra note 124, at 639-40
(discussing the circumstances upon which Madison’s report was based and concluding that
Madison’s statement may have represented his own wishful thinking more than a consensus
among the framers).
164. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (maintaining that adequate and
independent state grounds exist where a state court decision contains a plain statement that the
federal cases cited are used only for guidance and do not themselves compel the result).
165. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (stating that the Court renders an
advisory opinion when it reviews state court judgments that rested on adequate and
independent state grounds); Westling, supra note 7, at 383 & n.11 (maintaining that the Court
does not review state court decisions that are based on adequate and independent state
grounds because the Court does not want to imply a distrust in the integrity or ability of state
court judges).
166. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (stating that allowing claims by non-adverse parties without
a personal stake in the outcome would convert the judicial system into a public debate forum).
But see Matasar & Bruch, supra note 7, at 1302-03 (arguing that an actual dispute exists in
federal appellate review of state court decisions resting on adequate and independent state
grounds because parties do not litigate hypothetical cases on appeal).
167. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45-46 (1976) (denying
standing to parties challenging a federal tax statute because it was not substantially likely that a
decision favorable to the parties would have the desired effect).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the extent of the powers of the federal
judiciary); Westling, supra note 7, at 394 (stating that advisory opinions are banned by the case
or controversy requirement).
169. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 122, at 1043 (maintaining that a Supreme Court decision
that reverses a state court judgment would become an advisory opinion if, on remand, the state
court decided to reinstate its original decision based solely on state constitutional grounds).
170. The Supreme Court must, in light of the principles developed to identify a justiciable
claim, determine whether its opinion would be an impermissible advisory opinion. See
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Grounds Doctrine171 implicates Article III because the parties lose the
personal stake required by Article III,172 not because the Court’s
determination of the federal issues is not binding on the state
courts.173 Certainly, any opinion by the Supreme Court on an issue of
federal law is binding on all state and federal courts.174 The focus of
the State Grounds Doctrine, however, is on whether the Supreme
Court’s opinion will influence the outcome of the case such that the
parties retain a personal stake that assures an adversarial presentation
of the relevant issues.175
The Supreme Court must, in light of the principles developed to
identify a justiciable claim, determine whether its opinion would be
an impermissible advisory opinion or whether the case presents a
justiciable claim. In doing so, the Court must examine the record
from the state court and determine whether the state court based its
opinion on state law that will be unaffected by a determination of the
Supreme Court (advisory opinion) or whether the Supreme Court’s
opinion on the federal issues is sufficiently likely to influence the
outcome (justiciable controversy). The standing176 and mootness177
doctrines have evolved to enable federal courts to distinguish
Westling, supra note 7, at 404 (stating that rendering advisory opinions is an illegitimate
exercise of judicial power); see generally Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives
on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979) (noting that Article III
allows the federal judiciary to resolve abstract constitutional issues only if a dispute between
individuals exists).
171. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (stating that if a state court
decision is based on both federal and state grounds, the Court may not review the decision if
the state ground is independent and adequate to support the state court’s judgment).
172. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984) (noting that federal courts are not the
proper place to bring generalized grievances); see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 (maintaining that
Article III requires that the plaintiff in a judicial action profit personally from the case).
173. See, e.g., Brown v. Adams, 324 F. Supp. 803, 807 (D. Conn. 1971) (stating that rulings by
the Supreme Court bind all inferior federal courts and state courts); cf. Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,
891 (1983) (stating that the purpose of the standing requirement is to allow courts to perform
their functions well, rather than to prevent the courts from intruding in affairs best left to the
legislative and executive branches).
174. See, e.g., Brown, 324 F. Supp. at 807 (stating that rulings by the Supreme Court are the
“final law of the land”) (citing United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
278 F. Supp. 241, 251 (W.D. Pa. 1967)).
175. See Westling, supra note 7, at 397 n.78 (arguing that the purpose of the State Grounds
Doctrine is to ensure that decisions by the Court on federal questions will affect the outcome of
litigation after remand to the state courts).
176. See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“In its constitutional dimension,
standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’
between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III. This is the threshold
question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”).
177. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25 n.124 (1984) (“Mootness doctrine
addresses two kinds of questions. The first involves the liveness of issues, that is, whether there
is a continuing course of conduct the lawfulness of which remains in doubt. The second
concerns the continuing ‘personal stake’ of the parties in having the issues resolved.”).
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justiciable cases and controversies from attempts to invoke the federal
courts’ jurisdiction in a manner that would lead to the improper
rendering of advisory opinions.178 As the remainder of this Part will
explain, standing and mootness are not satisfied when a state court’s
judgment rests on adequate and independent state law.179 Cases
resting on adequate and independent state law, therefore, are
nonjusticiable in the Supreme Court.
A. Standing
The focus of the standing inquiry is whether “a party has a
sufficient stake in the otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain
judicial resolution of that controversy.”180 This “personal stake”
satisfies the Article III requirements of an actual dispute between
adverse litigants and a likelihood that the Court’s judgment will have
an impact.181
The “irreducible constitutional minimum”182 standing requirement,
articulated by the Supreme Court, consists of the following three
elements: “first, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in
fact’. . . . Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, it must be ‘likely,’
as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.”183
178. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
179. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (holding that a case must be dismissed if it
loses its character as a present live controversy, so that it does not become an advisory opinion
involving abstract legal ideas); cf. Scalia, supra note 173, at 890-93 (describing the effect that the
standing doctrine has on the relationship between the three branches of government).
180. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 498
(“[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to
justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.”) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962)).
181. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 732; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (holding that
Article III limits standing in federal courts to cases where the dispute is presented in an
adversary context and can be judicially resolved).
182. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
183. Id. at 560-61; see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (maintaining that the three elements of
standing assure that legal questions are resolved in a “concrete factual context”). The standing
requirement is equally applicable in civil and criminal cases. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 155 (1990) (applying the same standard for standing in a criminal case as that used in civil
cases). State Grounds Doctrine cases are often criminal cases. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983) (involving the question of whether the State Grounds Doctrine
barred review of a state criminal conviction arising from search and seizure of marijuana);
Burton v. Senkowski, No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL 669908, at *5 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1995)
(holding that the State Grounds Doctrine requires that the Court defer to the state court’s
dismissal of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim to a public trial relating to criminal
convictions for robbery and assault); Carter v. State, No. 05-94-00060-CR, 1995 WL 89802, at *1
(Tex. App. Mar. 1, 1995) (maintaining that the appellant must maintain adequate and separate
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It is the third element—the redressability requirement—that the
State Grounds Doctrine implicates. This redressability requirement
mandates that the federal court’s decision produces some change or
impact on the outcome of the case.184 The likelihood that the
judgment will have an effect, in turn, ensures that there is a live
controversy between adverse litigants, in the constitutional sense.185 If
the judgment will not have an impact, the parties have no personal
stake to guarantee adversariness and ensure that the matters
presented for resolution are of a judicial nature.186 In this way, the
redressability requirement ensures that a federal court will not
render an advisory opinion.
Therefore, the redressability requirement is a constitutional
requirement.187 The Supreme Court has referred consistently to
redressability as a constitutional element of standing,188 and the
redressability element promotes the constitutional advisory opinion
ban by requiring that there be a substantial likelihood that a
favorable federal court decision will have an impact.189
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,190 Justice Scalia, writing for a
plurality of Justices, addressed the redressability element.191 The
plaintiff in Lujan192 challenged a rule promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior (the “Secretary”) that interpreted a section of the
arguments for applying laws on state and federal grounds relating to seizure of cocaine
allegedly in violation of the United States Constitution and state constitution); People v. Torres,
543 N.E.2d 61, 62-69 (N.Y.2d 1989) (reasoning that policy on state and federal constitutional
privacy grounds does not have to be uniform if the states want to adopt a more protective
standard).
184. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (stating that there is not a justiciable
controversy when the plaintiff seeks an advisory opinion).
185. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 732 (maintaining that having a personal stake in the
controversy’s outcome will ensure an adversarial context and a dispute that can be judicially
resolved).
186. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 101 (holding that for a federal court to hear a case, the plaintiff
must have a personal stake in the controversy and the parties must be adverse).
187. But see Fallon, supra note 177, at 21-47 (arguing that the redressability element should
not be considered part of the constitutional standing requirement).
188. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (holding that redressability is one of three factors that make
up the constitutional minimum for standing); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating
that a core component of the standing requirement is that the injury will likely be redressed by
the requested relief); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)
(maintaining that Article III’s case or controversy standard requires federal courts to act by
addressing injuries traceable to the defendant’s action).
189. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 (stating that a plaintiff may satisfy standing with an injury that
will likely be redressed by a positive verdict); see also Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740 (maintaining
that a plaintiff seeking review must be affected personally by the judgment).
190. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
191. See id. at 561 (defining redressability element as a requirement that it be “‘likely,’ as
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’”)
(citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38-43).
192. See id. at 559 (describing the plaintiff as an “organization dedicated to wildlife
conservation and other environmental causes”).
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Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).193 The ESA provided that
each federal agency consult with the Secretary to “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by” the agency “is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species.”194 The Secretary had
interpreted this section to require consultation with a federal agency
only when the agency was undertaking action in the United States or
on the high seas.195 The plaintiff, however, contended that the statute
required consultation on all projects, including projects in foreign
countries, which were excluded from consultation under the
Secretary’s interpretation.196 Essentially, the plaintiff sought an
interpretation of the ESA requiring federal agencies to consult with
the Secretary before funding development projects that adversely
affected endangered or threatened species anywhere in the world.197
The Lujan Court concluded that the plaintiff, an environmental
group, the members of which included scientists who wanted to study
endangered species in foreign countries, lacked standing to maintain
the action because it did not satisfy the injury-in-fact element of the
standing requirement.198 Justice Scalia went on to discuss the
plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the redressability element.199 According to
Justice Scalia, there were two impediments to redressability. First, the
statute in question and the interpretation that would result from the
Lujan litigation were not necessarily binding on other federal
agencies.200 Therefore, a federal court judgment interpreting the
193. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)..
194. See id. § 1536(a)(2).
195. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 558-59 (describing the interpretation and noting that it came
after only one year of the statute’s existence).
196. See id. at 559 (stating that the plaintiff argued that the new interpretation was incorrect
in its geographic scope and that the initial interpretation that the statute was meant to be
enforced with regard to projects abroad should be reinstated).
197. See id. at 558-59 (noting that the plaintiff argued that the statute was meant to protect
species in the United States as well as in foreign nations).
198. See id. at 564 (explaining the reasons why the plaintiff did not satisfy the standing
requirement). The Court explained why the plaintiff failed to satisfy the standing requirement
as follows:
[T]he affiants’ profession of an “intent” to return to the places they had visited
before–-where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to
observe animals of the endangered species–-is simply not enough. Such “some day”
intentions–-without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification
of when the some day will be-–do not support a finding of the “actual or imminent”
injury that our cases require.
Id.
199. See id. at 571 (holding that relief granted by the district court would not redress the
injury-in-fact because the remedy required termination of funding by individual agencies that
did not supply all the funding to the foreign projects).
200. See id. at 569 (suggesting that a resolution by the district court would not remedy the
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ESA to require the Secretary to consult with federal agencies
regarding foreign projects would not always result in the consultation
desired by the plaintiff.201 Second, the plaintiff failed to show that
United States funding of foreign products was so significant that, if
eliminated, the lack of funding would stop the foreign projects and
result in less harm to the endangered or threatened species.202 In
other words, there was not a substantial likelihood that a favorable
judgment (i.e., a decision interpreting the ESA to require the
Secretary to consult with federal agencies regarding foreign projects)
would produce a decline in the destruction of endangered or
threatened species due to federal agencies’ consultation with the
Secretary.
Similarly, when a litigant seeks review by the Supreme Court of a
state court’s judgment that rests on independent and adequate state
law grounds, the personal stake, as defined by the redressability
element of the standing requirement, is lacking. In particular, the
Court’s determination that unreviewable state law grounds are
independent and adequate to support the state court’s judgment
represents a determination that there is not a substantial likelihood
that a favorable Supreme Court judgment (i.e., a judgment revising
the state court’s determination of the federal issues) will have an
impact on the state court’s judgment (i.e., cause a reversal of the state
court’s judgment).203
B. Mootness
The mootness doctrine is closely related to the standing
requirement described above.204 The mootness doctrine ensures that
the standing requirement, which must be satisfied at the outset of the
litigation, continues to be satisfied throughout the litigation.205
alleged injury because the agencies would not necessarily be bound by the decision).
201. See id.
202. See id. (stating that the injury was too speculative because the agencies only supplied a
fraction of the total funds necessary for the foreign projects).
203. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45-46 (1976) (stating that a
plaintiff has standing if a favorable decision will redress the plaintiff’s injury); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (holding that the Court’s decision must affect the plaintiff
personally).
204. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975) (describing the “close affinity”
between standing and mootness); see also Brilmayer, supra note 170, at 298-99 (stating that
standing and mootness have the unified purpose of assuring that the plaintiff has a personal
stake in the controversy); Fallon, supra note 177, at 26 (maintaining that standing and mootness
have similar functions because they both require “concrete adverseness” and limit judicial
involvement); Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1673 n.12
(1970) (claiming that the mootness doctrine, like the standing doctrine, cannot be categorized
or defined specifically).
205. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10 (defining the question of mootness as whether the need
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Mootness is “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of
the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness).”206 The mootness doctrine ensures that the plaintiff’s
personal stake and the live controversy between adverse litigants, as
defined by the three elements of standing, continue throughout the
litigation.207 A “moot” case is one in which the “factual or legal
context changes in such a way that a justiciable question no longer is
before the court.”208 In order for a case to become moot, there must
have been a justiciable controversy at the outset of the litigation that,
as a result of a change in circumstances, is no longer a live
controversy between adverse litigants.209
Taken together, the standing and mootness requirements fulfill
the objectives of the Article III case or controversy requirement by
ensuring that genuine adversariness exists at the outset and continues
throughout the course of litigation.210 Thus, standing and mootness
mandate that a case resting on independent and adequate state law
grounds is not justiciable.
Although the standing requirement may have been satisfied earlier
in the litigation, the requirement must continuously be met during
the pending litigation, both at the trial and appellate levels.211 The
Court stated in DeFunis v. Odegaard 212 that “‘[e]ven in cases arising in
the state courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a
federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction.’”213 Thus,
when considering whether to review a state court judgment, the

for judicial intervention persists throughout the litigation).
206. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1384 (1973).
207. See United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (stating that
the issue of mootness relates to circumstances where there is no longer a live controversy or the
parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome) (citing Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
208. See Richard K. Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class Actions, 35
STAN. L. REV. 897, 898 (1983); see also Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (stating that a
federal court should not proceed with a case when an event occurs while the appeal is pending
that makes it impossible for the federal court to grant any effectual relief).
209. See Don B. Kates, Jr. & William T. Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a
Coherent Theory, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (1974) (arguing that a party should not be able to
continue a case when the relevant issue is resolved while the case is pending or when the
parties’ interests become “not sufficiently adverse to ensure proper and effective presentation
of the arguments for each side”).
210. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 397 (stating that Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to
cases where adjudication is presented in an adversarial context).
211. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (defining mootness as requiring the
standing requirement to continue throughout the litigation).
212. 416 U.S. 312 (1974), vacating as moot 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973).
213. Id. at 316 (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).
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Supreme Court must determine whether the parties retain a personal
stake in the litigation.214
DeFunis involved an unsuccessful law school applicant’s state court
challenge, on federal constitutional grounds, to the University of
Washington’s admissions policy.215 Pursuant to a trial court order, the
plaintiff began law school while appeals were pending.216 The
Washington Supreme Court held that the school’s policy did not
violate the Constitution.217 By the time the case reached the Supreme
Court, the plaintiff was in his final term of law school.218 The
University had stated that it would permit the plaintiff to finish law
school and obtain his degree regardless of the outcome of the case.219
Consequently, the Court found that the Article III case or controversy
requirement was no longer satisfied and declined to reach the merits
of the case,220 despite Washington’s “great public interest” in the
Court’s resolution of the federal issues.221 The Court stated that a
judgment determining the legal issues involved was “no longer
necessary to compel [the] result, and could not serve to prevent it.”222
In other words, the parties no longer had “adverse legal interests” as
required by Article III.223
Although DeFunis was not a State Grounds Doctrine case,224 it serves
to illustrate how the concept of mootness applies in the State
Grounds Doctrine context. Just as a favorable determination by the
Supreme Court in DeFunis would have had no effect on the plaintiff’s
opportunity to complete law school and obtain his degree, when a
state court has based its judgment on unreviewable state law that is
independent of federal law and adequate to support the state court’s
214. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (requiring a plaintiff to have a
personal stake in the dispute to have standing); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968)
(maintaining that the parties must have a personal stake in the controversy and that the federal
courts will not rule on “friendly suits” or those that are “feigned or collusive in nature”).
215. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 314.
216. See id. at 314-15 (noting that the trial court granted an injunction to the plaintiff that
allowed him to commence his studies in the fall of 1970).
217. See DeFunis, 507 P.2d at 1186-88.
218. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 315-16.
219. See id. at 315-17 & nn.2-3.
220. See id. at 316-20 (refusing to consider the substantive constitutional issues because the
school had agreed to allow the plaintiff to complete his law school education regardless of the
outcome of the case).
221. See id. at 316 (stating that the Washington Supreme Court specifically identified the
“great public interest” in the issues raised).
222. See id. at 316.
223. See id. at 317 (“The controversy between the parties has . . . ceased to be ‘definite and
concrete’ and no longer ‘touch[es] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.’”) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Howarth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
224. There was no assertion that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision upholding the
school’s admissions policy was based on state law. See id.
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judgment, a favorable decision by the Supreme Court is not likely to
have an impact or bring about a favorable result for the party seeking
review of the federal questions. Thus, the party seeking review does
not have a personal stake, in the constitutional sense, despite the
presence of a public interest in the outcome of the federal issues or
the fact that the absence of Supreme Court review leaves ambiguity in
the law.225 In addition, the prevailing party in state court does not
have a continuing personal stake in the litigation; any incentive to
litigate vanished when the state court issued a favorable judgment
that will not be affected by the Supreme Court’s determination of the
federal issues.226
Although the Supreme Court has identified clearly and consistently
the three core standing elements as incidents of Article III’s
limitations on judicial power,227 the Court has been less clear about
what components of the mootness doctrine stem from Article III.228
In addition, although the Court has referred consistently to Article III
as the basis of the mootness doctrine,229 it has recognized this
doctrine as being more flexible than the standing doctrine.230 This
225. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-64 (1992) (holding that the
plaintiff was not affected directly by the Secretary’s actions and thus, did not have a personal
stake in the outcome); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (maintaining
that the plaintiff must have a personal stake in the dispute for the case to be justiciable).
226. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (arguing that for a dispute to be justiciable,
the plaintiff must be affected by the outcome).
227. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that the three standing requirements are: (1) that
the plaintiff suffered an “injury-in-fact,” (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
allegedly wrongful conduct, and (3) that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision). Arguably, however, the Court has been less clear in defining and applying the three
constitutional elements. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words
when we say that the concept of ‘Art[icle] III standing’ has not been defined with complete
consistency in all the various cases decided by this Court.”); JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY:
THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 1 (1978) (noting that “[j]udicial behavior [regarding
standing] is erratic, even bizarre,” and that “[t]he opinions and justifications do not illuminate”
the reasons why judges allow standing in certain cases and not in others); Gene K. Nichol, Jr.,
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 639-41 & n.30 (1985)
(describing the inconsistencies in applying the standing requirements).
228. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 277, 246 (1990) (“The ambiguous
constitutional status of the mootness doctrine complicates the matter.”).
229. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (“The inability of the federal
judiciary ‘to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art[icle] III of the Constitution
under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or
controversy.’”) (quoting Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964)); see also North
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (noting that mootness questions must be resolved
before federal courts can operate within their constitutional authority); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969) (stating that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a
moot case because doing so goes against the constitutional requirement that “judicial power
extends only to cases or controversies”); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50 n.8 (1968) (stating
that the Court is fully justified in foreclosing adjudication on an issue when it becomes moot).
230. See United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980) (referring
specifically to “the flexible character of the Art[icle] III mootness doctrine”); see also Fallon,
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flexibility has led to the question of whether the mootness doctrine is
a constitutional requirement or a prudential limitation on federal
jurisdiction.231 The answer to this question is central to determining
whether the State Grounds Doctrine is a constitutional requirement
because it is an application of the mootness doctrine.
The “flexibility” attributed to the mootness doctrine stems from the
Court’s application of three exceptions to the doctrine:232
(1) “capable of repetition yet evading review”; (2) “voluntary
cessation of challenged
conduct”;
and
(3)
“collateral
233
consequences.”
The first exception—“capable of repetition yet
evading review”—posits that an otherwise moot case will not be
subject to dismissal on mootness grounds if the same plaintiff might
again suffer the same injury, but again full appellate review will be
unavailable because, for example, the injury is short-lived and will
always vanish before full appellate review is completed.234 Under the
second exception, the defendant’s voluntary cessation of the
challenged conduct will not result in the case’s dismissal as long as
the defendant would be free to resume the challenged conduct after
dismissal. However, the court may dismiss the case provided that the
defendant can show that there is no reasonable expectation that the
challenged conduct will be resumed.235 Finally, the “collateral
consequences” exception prevents the dismissal of a case for
mootness even though the plaintiff’s primary injury has disappeared,
as long as some injury remains that could be redressed by a favorable
judgment.236
None of these exceptions permits the conclusion that a state
court’s judgment resting on independent and adequate state law
grounds presents a justiciable case or controversy for Supreme Court
review. The first exception—“capable of repetition yet evading
review”—relates primarily to the injury requirement and applies only
when the injury is fleeting and has disappeared before full appellate
review can be completed.237 As the State Grounds Doctrine does not
supra note 177, at 26-28 & n.30 (noting that the Court has decided mootness issues more
flexibly than standing issues).
231. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329-32 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting
that earlier cases did not state that mootness was based on Article III); see also Lee, supra note
124, at 609 (arguing that the mootness doctrine is not required by Article III, but rather
operates on a prudential basis).
232. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 2.5.1, at 127 (stating that “flexibility is manifested
[by] exceptions to the mootness doctrine”).
233. See id. §§ 2.5.2-2.5.4, at 128-39.
234. See id. § 2.5.3, at 131-32.
235. See id. § 2.5.4, at 136.
236. See id. § 2.5.2, at 128.
237. See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-15 (1911) (holding that short
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involve fleeting injury, the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception is inapplicable in the State Grounds Doctrine context.
The “voluntary cessation of challenged conduct” exception is
likewise inapplicable because this exception applies when one party
voluntarily ceases challenged conduct.238 In the State Grounds
Doctrine context, the injury is redressed by the judgment of the state
court and not by either party voluntarily ceasing the challenged
conduct.239 Thus, it is the Court’s inability to affect the state decision
that precludes review, not the conduct of either party.
Finally, the “collateral consequences” exception is inapplicable for
two reasons: (1) because the notion of collateral consequences
relates to the injury requirement (the idea is that although the
plaintiff’s main injury might have gone away, the plaintiff has another
“collateral” injury remaining) rather than the redressability
requirement; and (2) because the exception requires that the
continuing collateral consequences be redressable by a judgment of
the federal court.240 In the State Grounds Doctrine context, if a
collateral injury remains, it is not likely to be redressed by the
Supreme Court’s decision. Thus, the State Grounds Doctrine fails to
avoid the mootness bar under any of the currently recognized
exceptions.
In a concurring opinion in Honig v. Doe,241 Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that, in light of the mootness exceptions, the mootness
doctrine is a prudential limitation on the federal courts’
jurisdiction.242 Honig involved two California school children (Smith
and Doe) who had been expelled from public schools for allegedly
dangerous and disruptive conduct related to their disabilities.243 The
plaintiffs claimed that the expulsions were prohibited by a provision
of the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”), which states that
a disabled child may remain in his or her current school placement
term orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission were capable of repetition yet evading
review and therefore, not moot).
238. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953) (affirming the
dismissal of a suit because the defendant had ceased illegal activity during the course of
litigation).
239. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5.1, at 613-14 (explaining that the Supreme Court
may not hear a case when to do so will result in the same outcome as under state law).
240. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 51 (1968) (holding that review was appropriate
even after defendant had served his sentence because “there was a good chance that there
would be ‘ample opportunity to review’ the question presented on the merits in a future
proceeding”) (citing St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943)).
241. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
242. See id. at 329-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (claiming that the Court should either
abandon the mootness doctrine or at least relax it further than present jurisprudence allows).
243. See id. at 312-15.
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pending review of a decision to remove the child.244 By the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs had grown beyond
school age; plaintiff Smith was twenty years old and plaintiff Doe was
twenty-four years old.245 The majority held that Smith’s claim was
“capable of repetition yet evading review” because he was still entitled
to EHA benefits.246 Thus, according to the Court, Smith’s claim was
not moot.247 The majority, however, held Doe’s claim moot because
Doe was “no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the
EHA,” and thus, did not have an ongoing justiciable controversy.248
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued for a
reconsideration of the mootness doctrine and suggested that the
mootness doctrine is not required by Article III.249 Otherwise, Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued, the exceptions to the mootness doctrine
are unjustifiable:
If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us by the case or
controversy requirement of Article III itself, we would have no
more power to decide lawsuits which are “moot” but which also
raise questions which are capable of repetition but evading review
than we would to decide cases which are “moot” but raise no such
250
questions.

In light of his assessment of the mootness doctrine as prudential in
nature, Chief Justice Rehnquist proposed a new exception to the
mootness doctrine that would permit the Court to continue to
entertain cases that would become moot after the Court grants
certiorari or notes probable jurisdiction in the case.251 According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, entertaining these cases would avoid the
squandering of judicial resources after the decisional process is
underway.252
244. See id. at 312 (“[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to
[section 1415] . . . the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such
child . . . .”) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1994)).
245. See id. at 318.
246. See id. (holding that because Smith was less than 21 years old the possibility still existed
pursuant to § 1412(b)(2) of the EHA that he would again suffer a deprivation of EHA rights).
247. See id. (“[Smith’s] claim under the EHA, therefore, is not moot if the conduct he
originally claimed of is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’”).
248. See id.
249. See id. at 330 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that if the mootness doctrine is
based on the case and controversy requirement of Article III, then a claim must actually exist,
not merely be “capable of repetition”).
250. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
251. See id. at 330-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that preservation of the Court’s
“unique resources, [including] the time spent preparing to decide cases by reading briefs,
hearing oral argument, and conferring,” justified this proposed exception to mootness).
252. See id. at 332 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that “unique resources . . . are
squandered in every case in which it becomes apparent after the decisional process is underway
that we may not reach the question presented”).
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If mootness is prudential and such an exception existed, it would
apply in the State Grounds Doctrine context. In the State Grounds
Doctrine context, the litigants already have spent time and money
preparing to argue their case before the Supreme Court. The Court
also has spent time and judicial resources considering the
independence and adequacy of the state law grounds of decision, and
in the process, may have spent considerable judicial resources
considering the merits.253
In his dissenting opinion in Honig, Justice Scalia disagreed with
Chief Justice Rehnquist regarding the mootness doctrine. Justice
Scalia argued that the mootness doctrine is constitutionally based and
that exceptions to the mootness doctrine must, therefore, require the
plaintiff to retain a personal stake throughout the litigation to ensure
that a justiciable case or controversy remains.254 According to Justice
Scalia, the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception only
applies when the plaintiff can establish a “‘demonstrated probability’
or a ‘reasonable expectation’ that the same controversy will recur.”255
Under this standard, Justice Scalia concluded that Article III is
satisfied:
Where the conduct has ceased for the time being but there is a
demonstrated probability that it will recur, a real-life controversy
between parties with a personal stake in the outcome continues to
exist, and [A]rticle III is [not] violated . . . . [T]he probability of
recurrence between the same parties is essential to our jurisdiction
256
as a court . . . .

Under this view, the live controversy and personal stake requirements
must be met throughout the litigation, whether the analysis comes
under the mootness or standing rubric, because both doctrines
attempt to satisfy the “constitutional understanding of what makes a
matter appropriate for judicial disposition.”257
To conclude that mootness is prudential, mootness must be
separated constitutionally from standing.258 One argument is that as
long as the constitutional standing requirements are satisfied at the
outset of the litigation, the constitutional case or controversy
253. These expenses would occur in any case that raises justiciability issues and thus, would
be equally applicable to all prudential justiciability requirements.
254. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 332-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that “we have no power
under Art[icle] III of the Constitution to adjudicate a case that no longer presents an actual,
ongoing dispute between the named parties”).
255. See id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (ruling upon issues of mootness and
standing).
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requirement is satisfied, even if circumstances change and the case is
later rendered moot.259 The Supreme Court has, however, rejected
this view.260 Moreover, this argument is inconsistent with the case or
controversy requirement in general and the advisory opinion ban in
particular.261
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff files suit in federal court. At
the time the suit is filed there is a genuine dispute between the
parties and the standing requirement is met. Suppose, however, that
while the case is on appeal the parties settle the case, but agree, as a
condition of the settlement, to continue the appeal in a collusive
manner (the defendant hoping to generate favorable precedent that
will help in other litigation and the plaintiff willing to go along to
protect a favorable settlement). Such collusion at the outset of the
litigation would unquestionably violate Article III’s advisory opinion
ban, which precludes feigned or collusive lawsuits.262 It is difficult to
posit a constitutional argument that the result should be different in
a situation where the collusion began after the litigation was
underway. A better argument, therefore, is that the mootness
doctrine has a constitutional core that comports with the
constitutional core of the standing requirement to ensure that the
standing requirement is satisfied throughout the litigation.263
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently maintained a much lower
threshold to avoid dismissal on mootness grounds than to establish
standing. For example, one of the exceptions to the mootness
259. See id. (referring to state common law that allows jurisdiction in cases of great public
interest) (citing Defunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 n.6 (1973)). Even under this
rationale, state grounds cases would arguably be distinguishable from cases originating in the
federal district court. State grounds cases are first subjected to the Article III case or
controversy requirement when they are presented for Supreme Court review, whereas cases
originating in the district court are subjected to the Article III justiciability limitations at the
outset of the litigation. See id.
260. See id. (“The inability of the federal judiciary ‘to review moot cases derives from the
requirement of Art[icle] III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power
depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.’ . . . ‘[T]he question of mootness is a
federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Liner
v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) and North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246
(1971)).
261. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (“We are not permitted to render an
advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion.”).
262. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a
suit brought at the request of, and directed and financed by, the defendant because “it [was]
not in any real sense adversary”).
263. See Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 (stating that “federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them”); Fallon, supra note
177, at 14 (stating that “the Supreme Court has found that Article III requires adversariness in
fact”).
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doctrine is “voluntary cessation of challenged conduct.”264 Under this
exception, if the defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged
conduct, but is free to resume it, the case will not be dismissed on
mootness grounds.265 The rationale for this exception is that it would
be unfair to permit a defendant to defeat a claim by voluntarily
refraining from engaging in the challenged conduct while remaining
free to resume the conduct once the litigation is dismissed.266 Before
the Court will dismiss a case based on the defendant’s voluntary
cessation of the challenged conduct, the defendant must establish that
there is no “reasonable expectation” that the challenged conduct will
be resumed or reoccur.267 This standard permits cases to continue on
a much lower showing of imminent injury than that required to
establish standing to seek prospective relief, in which the relevant
inquiry is whether the plaintiff can establish an “actual or imminent”
injury.268
Los Angeles v. Lyons provides an example.269 In Lyons, the plaintiff
sued the City of Los Angeles for injuries caused by a police officer
applying a chokehold on him during a traffic stop.270 The plaintiff
brought suit challenging the policy permitting a police officer to use
deadly chokeholds in the absence of any threat of violence against

264. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633-36 (1953) (refusing to declare as
moot a suit in which the defendant had voluntarily ceased illegal activity but was not barred
from resuming such activity in the future).
265. See id. at 635 (refusing to grant an injunction even though the voluntary cessation of
conduct did not render the case moot).
266. See id. at 632 (stating that by declaring the case moot, “[t]he defendant is free to return
to his old ways”).
267. See id. at 633 (“The case may nevertheless be moot if the defendant can demonstrate
that ‘there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’”) (citation omitted).
268. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (dismissing a suit for
prospective relief because the plaintiff failed to show actual imminent injury to its members
even though it was able to show imminent injury to certain endangered species).
269. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
270. The facts were stated in Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion:
Lyons was pulled over to the curb by two officers of the Los Angeles Police
Department . . . for a traffic infraction because one of his taillights was burned out.
The officers greeted him with drawn revolvers as he exited from his car. Lyons was
told to face his car and spread his legs. He did so. He was then ordered to clasp his
hands and put them on top of his head. He again complied. After one of the officers
completed a pat-down search, Lyons dropped his hands, but was ordered to place
them back above his head, and one of the officers grabbed Lyons’ hands and slammed
them onto his head. Lyons complained about the pain caused by the ring of keys he
was holding in his hand. Within five to ten seconds, the officer began to choke Lyons
by applying a forearm against his throat. As Lyons struggled for air, the officer
handcuffed him, but continued to apply the chokehold until he blacked out. When
Lyons regained consciousness, he was lying face down on the ground, choking,
gasping for air, and spitting up blood and dirt. He had urinated and defecated. He
was issued a traffic citation and released.
Id. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the officer.271 In Lyons, the plaintiff was denied standing to seek
injunctive relief despite his serious injury because he could not
establish that he would be injured again in the same manner.272 In
the same case, however, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claim was
not moot, even though the police department had changed the
challenged chokehold policy, because, according to the Court, the
City of Los Angeles might resume the challenged policy after the
litigation.273 Arguably, the Court’s standing and mootness holdings
were not consistent if both doctrines represent the same Article III
principles.274 It seems inconsistent for the Court to say, on one hand,
that Lyons did not have standing because he could not show that he
would be injured again by the improper use of a chokehold,275 but on
the other hand, that the case was not moot even though the police
department had stopped the use of the chokehold, thereby ensuring
that Lyons would not again be subjected to the improper use of the
chokehold.
One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the
standing requirement is stricter to ensure that the plaintiff has the
requisite personal stake at the outset of the litigation; then, once the
requisite personal stake is established, a strong presumption attaches
that the personal stake will continue throughout the litigation.276
271. See id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 111 (“Absent a sufficient likelihood that [the plaintiff] will again be wronged
in a similar way . . . a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more
than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.”).
273. See id. at 101 (“We agree with the City that the case is not moot, since the moratorium
by its terms is not permanent. Intervening events have not ‘irrevocably eradicated the effects of
the alleged violation.’”) (citation omitted).
274. See id. Another example of the relaxed nature of the mootness exceptions is provided
by comparing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992). In Roe, the Court applied the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to
mootness, under which a case will not be dismissed as moot despite the lack of continuing
injury when the injury is “reasonably expected” to reoccur with regard to the same plaintiff but
will again evade review by the Court. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (holding that “[pregnancy] truly
could be ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’”). In Roe, the plaintiff, a pregnant woman
who sought a determination regarding the constitutionality of a state statute limiting her right
to obtain an abortion, was no longer pregnant by the time the case reached the Supreme Court
and did not have plans to again become pregnant. See id. at 124. The Court noted that
“[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the same woman,” and on that basis, concluded
that the case was not moot. See id. at 125. Compare this with Lujan, in which an environmental
group was denied standing to challenge an administrative interpretation of a statute because
the members of the group did not have concrete plans to visit the affected areas, as was
required to satisfy the “actual or imminent injury” requirement, even though the members had
professed an “intent” to visit the areas in the future. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 556.
275. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110.
276. Under this argument, the Lyons inconsistency would be resolved as follows: The case
was not moot because the City and the police department were free at any time to resume the
challenged chokehold policy; in fact, by its own terms the new policy limiting the use of the
chokehold was not permanent. See id. at 101 (noting that a policy change amounted to a six
month moratorium on the use of a particular type of chokehold in circumstances where the
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Another, perhaps better, explanation is that the Court has been
inconsistent in its approach to justiciability and needs to reassess the
doctrinal exceptions and formulate a consistent justiciability
jurisprudence that accurately reflects the Article III case or
controversy requirement.277
Despite the inconsistencies in standing and mootness analysis, both
doctrines share a constitutional core.278 Specifically, the parties must
retain a personal stake throughout the litigation to assure an
adversarial presentation of the case.279 This constitutional core is
implicated in the State Grounds Doctrine context because a state
court’s decision that rests on unreviewable state law grounds,
independent of the federal issues and adequate to support the state
court’s judgment, is not likely to be affected by Supreme Court
review.280 Thus, the parties no longer have a personal stake in the
litigation and the case is moot.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYZING CASES UNDER THE STATE GROUNDS
DOCTRINE
A party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must
establish a justiciable case or controversy.281 A litigant may establish a
officer was not justified in using deadly force). Lyons’s personal stake in the litigation-–if he
had one-–was not diminished by the police department’s voluntary and temporary change in
policy; he had no assurance that the police would continue to refrain from improperly using
the chokehold. See id. at 105 (stating that Lyons would have had standing if he could prove that
there was a likelihood that the police would once again use a chokehold on him). On the other
hand, the element of standing that requires that Lyons had the requisite “injury-in-fact” is
tougher to satisfy, since one must have the requisite “personal stake” in the litigation before one
can lose the personal stake. See id. The Court held that to have standing to seek prospective
injunctive relief, Lyons was required to establish an imminent future injury (i.e., a likelihood
that Lyons would again be illegally choked). Lyons was unable to do so. See id. at 105-06. If,
however, Lyons could have established the requisite injury–-a likelihood that he would be
subjected to a future chokehold–-that injury would not have been diminished by the City’s
voluntary change in policy. Lyons would retain his personal stake in the litigation because the
City would remain free and, arguably, reasonably likely to reinstate the unconstitutional policy.
277. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 589-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court, in
imposing fresh limitations on an old doctrine, strayed outside the traditional Article III
justiciability requirements, thus “resurrect[ing] a code-pleading formalism in federal court
summary judgment practice”).
278. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “where
the conduct has ceased for the time being but there is a demonstrated possibility that it will
recur, a real-life controversy between parties with a personal stake in the outcome continues to
exist,” thus satisfying Article III).
279. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (explaining that the mootness doctrine
requires that the litigating parties have legally cognizable interests in the outcome of the case).
280. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 10.5.1, at 613-14 (stating that an important limitation
on Supreme Court review of state decisions is that “the Court must decline to hear the case if its
reversal of the state court’s federal law ruling will not change the outcome of the case”). Thus,
if the Supreme Court cannot change the outcome of the case, then there is no case or
controversy and therefore, the case is not justiciable under Article III.
281. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (noting that the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction
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justiciable case or controversy and thereby invoke the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to review a decision of a state court in one of two
ways: (1) by establishing a basis for “merits” review of the state law
determination of the state court;282 or (2) by establishing that the
purported state grounds of decision are either inadequate to support
the state court’s judgment or not sufficiently independent of the
federal law issues to preclude Supreme Court review.283
Whether Article III permits the Supreme Court to review
judgments of state courts depends on whether there is a substantial
likelihood that a favorable decision by the federal court will have an
impact on the outcome.284 Whether the case is moot-–because the
Court’s determination is not substantially likely to have any impact on
the outcome-–breaks down into two separate inquiries: (1) whether
the state court’s state law determinations are subject to “merits”
review by the Supreme Court;285 and, if not, (2) whether Supreme
Court review of the federal issues in the case would amount to an
advisory opinion because there is no actual dispute between adverse
litigants or there is no substantial likelihood that a judgment
favorable to the party seeking review will have an impact.286 To make
the second determination, the Court must look to the
“independence” and “adequacy” factors as indicators of whether “it is
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”287 If the Supreme Court’s decision
on the federal issues likely will have an impact on the state court’s
judgment, then the parties have the requisite personal stake in the
litigation to assure adversarial presentation of the issues, as required
by Article III.288
The test must focus on the Article III concerns, particularly the
concerns raised by the redressability element of the standing
bears the burden of satisfying the standing requirement). In the State Grounds Doctrine
context, the party seeking Supreme Court review of the state court’s judgment is the party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court.
282. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98-100 (1938) (passing judgment on
reviewing the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination of a teacher’s contractual rights under
Indiana State Law).
283. See supra notes 85-123 and accompanying text (discussing the adequacy and
independence requirements of the State Grounds Doctrine).
284. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1974) (stressing the importance of a
federal court’s ability to affect the rights of litigants in an Article III analysis).
285. See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text (defining and exemplifying what
constitutes a “merits” review).
286. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (referring to the constitutional ban on
advisory opinions as a rationale for the State Grounds Doctrine).
287. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
288. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 316-17 (stating the importance of a federal court’s ability to
affect the rights of litigants in an Article III analysis).
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requirement and the mootness doctrine.289 The State Grounds
Doctrine stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court will not
review federal issues if the state grounds of the decision support the
judgment and thus, implicitly assumes that the state law issues are not
subject to “merits” review.290 The threshold inquiry, therefore, is
whether the state law issues are subject to merits review. If the state
law grounds of decision are themselves subject to merits review, then
the claim is justiciable because, by definition, there is a substantial
likelihood that the Court’s determination will have an impact.
Consequently, the federal issues are reviewable as well.
If the state law issues are not subject to merits review, then they are
subject to jurisdictional review to determine if they are independent
of federal law and adequate to support the state court’s judgment.291
If the state law grounds of decision are inadequate to support the
state court’s judgment, because they arguably impinge federal rights,
the state court’s judgment is subject to “substantive federal question”
review by the Supreme Court.292 If the state law grounds of decision
are adequate to support the state court’s judgment, then the Court
must determine whether they are sufficiently independent of the
federal issues to suggest that the review of the federal issues will not
have an impact because the state court is not likely to change its
conclusion on the state law issues once corrected on the federal
issues.293
A state court opinion that includes a Long294 statement
demonstrates the court’s intention to ground its decision on
independent state law; therefore, the Long statement provides a
sufficient basis on which the Supreme Court may conclude that the
state law is indeed independent of the federal law.295 By including
such a statement, the state court is sending a message that, despite
looking to federal law as persuasive authority for its interpretation of
state law, the court’s determination is based on state law.296 Thus, the
289. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (explaining how a case is effectively moot if the Supreme Court
has no power to redress a decision because the decision is based on adequate and independent
state grounds).
290. See supra Part I.A (discussing generally the State Grounds Doctrine).
291. See supra notes 66-70 (discussing jurisdictional review).
292. See supra notes 70-76 (discussing and defining “substantive federal question review”).
293. See supra Part I.B (discussing adequacy and independence as a prerequisite analysis
before Supreme Court review).
294. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
295. See id. at 1038 & n.4 (illustrating instances where state law is independent of federal
law).
296. See id. at 1041 (“If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds, [the
Supreme Court] . . . will not undertake to review the decision.”).

1096

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1053

Supreme Court may conclude that its judgment on the federal issues
will not have an impact on the state court’s determination of state
law.297
The absence of such a statement, however, should not give rise to a
presumption of reviewability. There might be any number of reasons
why the state court omitted a Long statement. For example, state
courts may omit the Long statement out of a desire to obtain the
Supreme Court’s advice on the federal issues before it commits to an
interpretation of state law. Alternatively, a state court may omit a
Long statement because of an unawareness of the Long holding or
poor opinion drafting.298
Only the first reason-–a desire to obtain the Supreme Court’s
advice on the federal issues before committing to an interpretation–presents an appropriate basis for a presumption of justiciability.299
On the surface, it looks as though the state court is seeking an
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court.300 There remains,
however, a justiciable controversy between adverse litigants because a
favorable Supreme Court decision on the federal issues is likely to
have an effect on the state court.301 In essence, the state court is, in
this scenario, omitting the Long statement because the federal issues
are not truly independent of the state issues.302 The parties remain
adverse, each interested in obtaining a favorable Supreme Court
judgment on the federal issues and the favorable state court
judgment that is likely to follow therefrom on remand, and thus, the
case is not moot.303
It is the adversariness of the parties that provides the personal stake
required to render the case justiciable, not merely that the state court
is bound by the Supreme Court’s pronouncements of federal law.304
297. See id. at 1040 (“Respect for state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory
opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an
adequate and independent state ground.”).
298. See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 122, at 1047-59 (studying state courts’ reactions to
Long).
299. See id. at 1057-59 (explaining how state courts often base opinions on federal grounds
to seek Supreme Court guidance on the resolution of state issues) (citing California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992 (1983)).
300. Cf. id. at 1058 (claiming that this strategy does result in the issuance of advisory
opinions).
301. Once the federal issue is resolved, the case will return to the state court for
consideration of the judgment.
302. But see Rosenfeld, supra note 122, at 1058 (arguing that by intentionally intertwining
state and federal law the state court hinders its own constitutional development and
perpetuates confusion as to which authority should be followed).
303. See supra note 301 (explaining that the federal decision will be applied on remand
where an outcome is still pending).
304. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate ‘a
personal stake in the outcome’ in order to ‘assure concrete adverseness which sharpens the
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The state court is bound by the Supreme Court’s conclusions of
federal law in any case. The question central to the justiciability
inquiry is whether the parties retain a personal stake in the litigation
due to the likelihood that a favorable Supreme Court judgment will
impact the state court’s judgment.305 When the state court omits the
Long statement out of a recognition of the interdependence of the
state and federal legal issues, the judicial power extends to permit the
Supreme Court to review the federal issues in the case.306
On the other hand, other reasons for the state court’s omission of
a Long statement have nothing to do with the independence of state
law and therefore, a presumption of independence in these cases
would be inappropriate.307 The Supreme Court must determine the
justiciability.308 Whether a state court’s decision interpreting state law
is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment
is a question of federal law and therefore, is subject to Supreme
Court review.309 The problem with the Long presumption is that the
Supreme Court cannot tell from the state court’s opinion why the
state court omitted the Long statement. Consequently, the Court
should not presume that the absence of the Long statement means
that the state court did not intend its judgment to be independent of
presentation of issues’ necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional issues.”) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Even if the state court is bound by the Supreme
Court’s determinations regarding federal issues, the federal decision must still impact the
parties at the state level because to allow otherwise would permit the rendering of advisory
opinions in cases where there is no personal stake. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042
(1982) (“The jurisdictional concern is that we not render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court . . . our review could amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion.”) (citations omitted).
305. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040 (stating that “dismissal is inappropriate where there is a
strong indication . . . that the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the decision
below”) (citations omitted).
306. See id. at 1042 (holding that the Court will assume that there are no adequate and
independent state grounds whenever a clear statement to the contrary is omitted and “when it
fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily upon federal law”).
307. See id. at 1041 (finding that while “[i]t is fundamental that state courts be left free and
unfettered ‘from federal review when interpreting purely state law,’ it is equally [fundamental]
that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a
determination by [the Supreme Court] of the validity under the federal constitution of state
action”) (citations omitted).
308. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (“‘Even in cases arising in the state
courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal court must resolve before it
assumes jurisdiction.’”) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)); Long, 463
U.S. at 1038 (“It is, of course, ‘incumbent on this Court . . . to ascertain for itself . . . whether
the asserted non-federal ground independently and adequately supports the judgment.’”)
(quoting Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931)).
309. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1038 (stating that the Supreme Court must analyze the
independence and adequacy of a state court determination before it can hear the case); Henry
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (claiming that the question of when and how defaults in
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude consideration of federal questions, is itself
a federal question).
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federal law.310 Thus, the Long presumption abdicates the Court’s
fundamental responsibility to determine for itself whether the Article
III case or controversy requirement has been satisfied.
Significantly, the availability of a federal forum for litigating federal
claims is implicated when the Court is unavailable to review state
court judgments in cases involving federal issues. The federal courts
are important in promoting the supremacy and uniformity of federal
law, as well as protecting federal rights. These interests underscore
the importance of the Court’s undertaking its own independent
analysis of a state court’s judgment to determine whether a justiciable
claim is presented.311
The availability of a federal forum, however, is subject to the
limitations of Article III.312 Moreover, properly applied, the State
Grounds Doctrine does not interfere with the interests in federal
supremacy, uniformity of federal law, and protection of federal
rights. Uniformity of federal law is not undermined significantly
because any opinion rendered by the state court on the federal issues
is, by definition, unnecessary to the judgment,313 and thus, is obiter
dicta. The persuasive value of various interpretations of federal law
will not undercut uniformity, but arguably will enrich the judicial
process by providing a variety of rationales that may guide the
Supreme Court when ultimately the issue is properly presented for
resolution. Further, proper application of the State Grounds
Doctrine does not interfere with federal rights or federal supremacy.
A state court judgment that impermissibly interferes with a federal
right is not adequate to preclude federal review.314 Thus, a claim that
310. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1039-42 (requiring state courts to make an express and
unambiguous statement that the grounds for the decision are based upon purely state law to
preclude federal court review).
311. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 291 (1821) (holding that
before the Court may invoke jurisdiction, “it must be shown that this is a case arising either
under the Constitution, or a law of the United States”).
312. See id. (“[T]he judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority.”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
313. If the state court’s conclusion on the federal issues is necessary to the state court’s
judgment, it is, by definition, not independent of the state law grounds of decision. See Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1944) (holding that although the Court may not review decisions
based upon adequate and independent state grounds, the Court has the power to review state
judgments to the extent that “they incorrectly adjudge federal rights”). A Supreme Court
opinion on the federal issues would, therefore, be sufficiently likely to impact the state court’s
judgment that the parties retain the necessary personal stake in the litigation to render the case
justiciable before the Supreme Court.
314. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 290-95 (discussing the Supreme Court’s power to
review state law that infringes a federal right); see also Henry, 379 U.S. at 447-48 (holding that a
state procedural ground for a decision must serve a legitimate state interest to present a valid
bar to the adjudication of federal rights).
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state law constitutes an infringement of a federal right or an
interference with federal supremacy is justiciable.315
In addition to the importance of a federal forum, there are other
reasons why a party seeking Supreme Court review might want the
Court’s definitive answer to the federal questions raised in the case.316
For instance, a party may wish to eliminate ambiguity in the law,
obtain favorable precedent for future litigation, or have the personal
satisfaction of a victory in the Supreme Court of the United States.317
Although these are all “interests” in the sense that the litigant would
benefit, none of them provides the “personal stake” required by
Article III. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that even a “great
public interest in the continuing issues raised by [an] appeal” does
not save a case from mootness dismissal.318 When a state court’s
judgment rests on adequate and independent state law grounds, the
litigant’s interest in obtaining Supreme Court review does not
include obtaining a favorable judgment in the case; the legal tests for
independence and adequacy have already been applied to determine
that a favorable decision by the Supreme Court is not likely to have
an impact (i.e., result in a favorable judgement for the party seeking
review).319 Consequently, the litigant does not have a personal
stake—in the constitutional sense—in the litigation.
Similarly, the responding party does not have a personal stake. If
there was a likelihood that Supreme Court review could impact the
state court’s judgment, the responding party would have an
adversarial interest in the litigation to protect the favorable state
court judgment.
When the state court’s judgment rests on
315. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938) (establishing federal
jurisdiction over a claim concerning the validity of a contract termination pursuant to a state
statute that allegedly violated Article I, section 10’s prohibition of state impairment of
contracts).
316. Of course, there are always benefits that flow from advisory opinions; it would save
Congress a great deal of time and effort if the Supreme Court would comment on the
constitutionality of pending legislation.
The constitutional policy prohibiting advisory
opinions, however, requires judicial restraint. See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text
(discussing Article III’s case and controversy requirement and its limiting effect on federal
judicial power).
317. A prosecutor, in particular, might have a strong interest in pursuing Supreme Court
review of state court judgments reversing convictions on state law grounds. For example, a
prosecutor might want to obtain guidance for law enforcement officers or to obtain federal
precedent which might be used to persuade the state supreme court to uphold future
convictions.
318. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1973) (dismissing unsuccessful law school
applicant’s federal constitutional challenge to a school’s admission practices despite the State of
Washington’s “great public interest” in the issues involved).
319. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1982) (stating that the Court is powerless to
decide federal issues when state court’s judgment is based on state law because to do otherwise
would result in an advisory opinion).
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independent and adequate state grounds, however, the Supreme
Court’s determination of the federal issue will not impact the state
court’s judgment. Consequently, the responding party has no
adversarial interest in pursuing the case. The case is over.
CONCLUSION
The State Grounds Doctrine is a limitation on the power of the
Supreme Court to review a state court judgment that adequately rests
on state law, independent of federal law issues in the case. The State
Grounds Doctrine derives from the Article III advisory opinion ban,
in general, and the constitutional standing requirement and
mootness doctrine, in particular.
The Article III standing
redressability element demands a likelihood that a favorable federal
court judgment will effect the outcome of the case. If no likelihood
exists that a favorable judgment will have some effect, the parties do
not have the requisite personal stake in the litigation. The mootness
doctrine, at its constitutional core, requires that the standing
requirement, which must be satisfied at the outset of the litigation,
continues to be satisfied throughout.
In the context of the State Grounds Doctrine, these justiciability
doctrines require an inquiry into the likelihood that a favorable
Supreme Court opinion on the federal issues will have an impact on
the state court’s judgment. If the state law grounds of decision are
adequate to support the state court’s judgment and independent of
the federal issues in the case such that a favorable Supreme Court
opinion on the federal issues is not likely to change the outcome of
the case, then the standing requirement is not satisfied and the case
is constitutionally moot.

